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The wrld today is in a state of continuing crisis. Like the sword of 
Damacles, the nuclear weapons in the hands of the majorpowers pose a tllreat 
ot destruction of the hllll8n race as a Whole. In this world context India 
follows a foreign :poli".:Y based UPon t'b.e principles of non-alignment. In the 
cold war, India hes not taken aides with any Of the pawer blocs of the East or 
the West. India 1a not alone in this. Meny of the Af'ro..AsUm. countries which 
attained :f'reedan after the Second World l-kr have joined hends with India in 
adopting the policy of. n.on.-eligmrant in their respective countries. These 
countries coostitute the 'l'bil"d World. Tb.ere is both support for and oppcsition 
to this in the West. 
An attempt is made in this thesis to explicate India• s foreign policy of 
non-alignment and the influence of Gandhian ideology at non-violence. In all 
the amiaisof hl.Ell8ll history, it was Mahtma Gandhi wo used the :principle of 
non-violence for a political purpose • to win freedan i'ran an alieu rule for 
his country. '?his was his greatest contribution to the world a.a a whole. If 
he was alive today he would strive with all the resources at his camnand to 
substitute moral warfare 1n the place of nuclear war.fare. 
Critics of India repeat the slogan, "If you are not with us, You are againS' 
us." This is wrong. Those who have read and understood the history of dif• 
ferent nations will not subscribe to this view. The history of the United 
states itself is en instance :ln point. Under the Monroe Doctrine the United 
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states followed a foreign policy of non-alignment for 'W'!ll over a century 
and a half. It is a matter ot camnon lm.owledge to the student of u.s. history 
th.et this policy was one of the most essential elements,among others, which 
enabled hei· to build up her strength as a powerful nation. 
W'aen India annexed the Portuguese possession ot Goa 1n I.ndia by' military 
means after all attempts at I>ersuesion had failed, the question was asked, 
"How could a non-violent L"ldia invade Goat" Similarly 1 wen Ind.is had resor• 
ted to military means to safeguard l'.ashmir fran Pakistan and her North-
F.astern boundary from Red China, d1a1llun1onment in Indiannon-violence be• 
gan to trouble tlie minds of. some critics 'Who accused her i'01.· tidopting double 
standards. As I will attempt to shO"w-1 bhis again is wrong. Thoae \1110 have 
correctly u.nde:r:::.-tood the Gandhian ideology Will hesitate to c,.iticise.India 
has not swerved fran t.1'.le Gandhian 1dee.1 of non-violence et any time. 
This thesis on "Gandhian. Iaeology and India's Foreign Policy," is an 
altogether novel thesis. It can.prises the t'ollow:tng Pl~opc..sitions: • 
a.) India's foreign policy of non-aligm:ient is based an Gandhian creed 
of nan-violence, 
b) Notw:tthstand ing the fact that India used f'oree to dea 1 vi th her 
neighbors in defense of her territory, she did not deviate tran 
Gandhian principles, and 
c) the Gandhian ideology of nan-violence is by far the best method to 
settle international disputes. 
As this thesis is primarily a study in India's foreign policy the 
method of historical narration with detailed chronological survey of events 
was not followed 1n dealing with the exposition of Gandhian ideology for the 
simple reason that this study is in the context ot his philosophy of lite. 
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The history of the movements of ncm.-violent resistance led by °"'.:nc{J:.L ...i."'-"'t 
others is outside the scope of this thesis. 
My claims to write this thesis are twofold - personal experience a.no 
research. I have seen Mahatma Gandhi and Jawherlal Nehru 1n person, heard 
their speeches cm. many oecasians and read their writings both before and 
after Independence. Besides, I also took part in the Indian politics at the 
state level f'r<Xn 1952 to 1962 as an elected Member of the state Legislature 
for Madras and practised as a lawyer until 19~. As regards my study and 
research, I have takan sufficient care to see that the limited access to 
Indian sources here does not af'f'ect this thesis tran being :Interesting and 
mstructi ve. 
CilAnJ.il\ II 
GANDHIAN D>EOIDGI •WHAT IT ISt 
Men of good will in the past have raised their voice against violan.ce 
and senseless destruction. Jesus Christ advised the tun.ing of the other 
cheek. Lao Tze preached to meet the good with goodness, the bad also with 
goodae as. Buddha taught that men must overcaae anger b:y love, evil b:y good, 
lie b:y truth. 'l'horeau declared that 1n an unjust state, the proper place 
tor a just man was the prison. 
Mahatma Ganh1 was the first man who used naav1ol.ence for a spec1ficall:y 
Political pUrpOse. He ccmsistently' preached nonviolence as an instrment for 
shaping the destinies of nations. This nan.violence was not mere sumission 
to violence, the passive nanresistence to evil, but a patient and persistent 
challenge to violance, un.til the latter should exhaust itself and be over-
cane. This is the greatest contribution of Mahatma Gandhi to the modern age. 
What,, then, is this creed of nonviolence! Ahimsa (nonviolence) was for 
Mahatma Gandhi the basic law of our hum.an conduct. That is wh:y it can be 
used as the most ettective principle tor social action, since it is in deep 
accord with the truth of man's nature and correspcads to his innate desire 
tor peace, justice, order, freedaa and personal die;M.t:r. Since himsa. 
(violence) degrades and corrupts man, to meet force with force end hatred 
with hatred anl:y increases man's progressive degeneration. Nonviolence, an 
the contraey, heals and restores man's nature, while giving him a means to 
restore social order and Justice. AWJqsa is onl:y incidentall:y a Policy for 
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the seizure of power. It is 1n esse:ace and b. its political aspect a wa7 of' 
transforming relatian.ships so as to bring about a peaceful transfer of :power, 
effected :t'reel7 and without ccmpulaioa b7 all concer.aed 1 because ell have 
cane to recognize it as right. Mahatma Ga:adhi believed tW!t when. the prac-
tice of ahimsa beccmes uaiversal, God will reign. an. earth as He does 1n Rea-
ven. 
Mahatma Gandhi called his nonviolent resistan.ce Satns:raha. Literall.7 
translated, the word "Satyagraha" meaas tasiste:ace on truth. The can.tent of 
the word, however, includes an elaborate program. The con.cept has ccme to 
be applied to all the organized and ccmcerted activities which were coordin-
ated 1:a a particular patter.a of a successful Satyagraba • that of the nation-
alists 1n :India pledged to Gadhi1s doctrine of nonviolence. In most cases, 
these mass actions were extra-legal mad extra-constitutional; the7 outgrew 
parliamentaey procedure ud becCllle revolutionary. 'l'hus Satyagrah becanes e. 
form of direct actioa 1n so f'ar as the people take the law 1n their own hands. 
In coatrast to war or violent revolution, however, Sat7graha is n.oaviolent 
direct action. 
Gadhi1 s own. views on Sat7graba are expressed 1n the following quotation 
f'ran his work: 
·Ia Sat7graha the cause has to be just ud clear 
e.s well as the meaas. II-33 
l 
·1'he ideal of Sat7graha is aot meaat for the 
select f'ew - the saint and the seer on.17; it is 
meant for all. 2 II-34 
l 
'l'hanas Merton, ed., Q!!.dhi oa Nonviolence,(Nev Directions, 1965), 
p. 28. 
2 Ibid. 
To lay doil!l one's l1i'e for what one considers to 
be right is the very core of Satyagraha. II-59 
3 
The sword ot the Satyagrah1 is love, and the un• 
shakrble firmness that ccnes fran it. 4 II-59 
The training of' Satya.grapha is meant far all, ir• 
respective ot age or sex. The more important part 
of the training here is men.tall, not physical. 
Th.ere can be no empulsion. in mental training. r;_ 
II'!"OU 
Satyagraha is always superior to armed resistance. 
'l'b.is can only be effectively proved by demanstra-
tian, not by argument •••• Satyagraha. can never be 
used to defend a wrong cause. 6 II-60 
The cond.itians necesaaey for the success ot Se.tya-
graha are: 
l) The Satye.grab.i should not have e:ny hatred in 
his heart against the opponent. 
2) The issue must bl! tru.e and substantial. 
3) The Sat;yagre.hi must be prepared to suffer till 
the end.' 7 II-6i 
The root Of Sat;ygraha is in prayer. A Satygrahi 
:-eltes upon God for protection. against the tyrann;y of 
brute force. 8 II-62 
The art ot d;ying tor a Sat;yagrahi consists in 
fac :lng death cheerfully :l.n the pertorm&J1Ce s Of 
' ' one s dut;y. 9 
The millions of unassuming and most pa.rt illiterate Indian villagers 
understood Satyagralla to mean that it was "Gandhi's wa;y ot t'1ght:l.ng the 
3 Ibid., p. 29. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid, 
7 Ibid., p. 30. 
8.DJ4. 
9~. 
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British Raj." But to more sophistica.ted Indians, Satysgraha was a new t:y,pe 
of' war of which Gandhi was the fotmtainhead. Viewed as a technique for 
solving conflict, Gendhi's ideology beccmes a form of struggle to achieve 
social ends. 
Mahatma Gandhi believed that Truth was Goc1. In the general sense of' the 
word, Satyagraha means the way or life one holds steadfastly to God and ded• 
icates his life to llim. The true Satyagreh1 1 there.tore, is a msn of God. 
As an individ'Wll he finds himself against evil which he cannot but resist. 
He finds 1.11 the society 1n which he lives 1n particular and the world in 
general, 11'l.1llstice1 cruelty, exploitation and oppression. In his struggle 
his reliance is cm. Truth or God, and since the greatest truth is the unity 
of all life 1 truth can be atta:f.ne.j only by loving service of' all • by nonvio• 
lence. The weapon of the Sat,agrah:l. is therefore nonviolence. Satyagraha 1 
in the narrower sense in which it is ordinarily u;nderstood 1 accordingly' means 
resisting evil through aoul-torce or nonViol eee. C .F. Andrews writes: 
Among Mahatma Gandhi 1 s practical religious ideals 
the emphasis seems alweys placed upan Ahimsa 1 or 
Bon•V1oleace. It 1s diff ieult in the West to 
realize how this had becane to him the heart ot 
a.ll re U.gion. It is bound up absolutely in his 
mind with 1'.ruth. He holds that the truth ot all 
life an. this planet and of God HSmselt is to be 
found in this principle ot the sacredness ot life 
and refusal to use violence. This principle he 
calls Ahinsa / which means literally Nan•Violence. 
There is an ear:J.y Christian saying in the Epistle 
to Diogenetus: ''Violence is not the attribute ot 
God. 1 This would hsve won hie wholehearted adher• 
enee.10 
As a resister of the evil, the Satyagrehi has to discipliae himself in 
tP 
Mahatma Qs.dh1' s T.deas (N .Y. : Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 131. 
self-control, simplicity of life, suffering without fear or hatred. Mahatma 
Gandhi emphasized that his followers should take VOW'S to train themselves 1n 
eatygraha. They were: truth, ncmviolence, b~b!m (celibacy), tearless• 
ness, control of the palate, non-possesaiai, non-stealing, bread-labor, equal• 
ity of religions, ant1-untoucbab111ty and m4eah1 (the principle of using 
goods made in one's own country). 
Mahatma Gandhi had clearly emmc1ated the moral requirements tor aatJ'&• 
graha. Once a queat1cn was M to him. "Was it tl"'W! that passive resistance 
( sat'881'aha) was the weapon of the wealtf" Be replied: 
Thia is gross ignorance. Passift resistance 1 that 
is soul-force, 1a matchless. It is superior to the 
force of arms. How then, can it be considered onl7 
a weapon of the wea:kf ~s1cal-f'orce men are 
strangers to the courage that is requisite in a 
passive resister. Do you. belieft that a coward 
can ever disobey a law that he dislikest11 
~o add strength to his point that nonviolence is su.perior to brute 
force Mahatma Oendh1 posed the counter question: 
Wherein is courage required - in blowing others 
to pieces trm. behind a canncn, or with a ad.ling 
face to appraaeh a canncn and be blown to pieces! 
Who is the tru.e warrior - he who keeps death al-
ways as a bo&Qll-triend, or he who ccmtrols the 
death ot others! Bellew me that a man devoid of 
courage and manhood can newr be a passive resis-
ter.12 
He Pointed out that passive resiatence is an all-sided sword, it can be used 
anJb.O\rl'J it blesses him who uses it and him against whQ'I it ls used. Without 
dra:wins a drop ot blood it prodw::es tar-reaching results. 
11x. K. Oendh11 lm•J12lsm.t je1istap.ce { SltD8£!b!) (N .Y.: Schocken 
Books, 1961), p. 51. 
l2 
.11aa4., p. 52. 
Satys.graha 1 in. the narrower sense 1 takes many forms. Primarily it is 
a case of appealing to the reason and con8'!ience o:f' the opponent by inviting 
su.f"i'ering on one self. The mot:t ve is to convert i;he opponent and make him one' 
rilling ally and companion. It iG based on the idea that the moral appeal 
to the hei;.u.•t and conscience . ts, in the case of llUiuan beings, more effective 
t:tum an appeal based an thrent of bodily pain ar violence. Indeed violence 1 
according to Mtlbatma Gandhi, does not overcome evil; it suppressas it for the 
tinle being to rise later with redoubled vigor. Nonviolence, on the other 
han.d, pu-!;s an end to evil, for it converts the evil-doer. "The aim of indi• 
vldtlal as well as group satyagraha is not to crush, defeat or P\lllish the ty-
rant or break his will. It is not even to harm or embarass him 1 though the 
resistance and suffering may 1 as a matter of' f's ct 1 cause tb:.e wrong-doer 
embarassment. 'J.'he satJ8,grahi loves the opponent e,s the human being and aims 
at rousing him to e aenae of equity by an appeal to the best in him, i.e., 
at converting him. Conversion implies that the opponent realizes his mistake 1 
13 
repents end there takes place a peaceful adjustment of differences. As 
Gandh1j1 once remarked to Miss Agatha Harrison, tttrhe essence of' non-violent 
technique is that it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but not the a.ntagon.ists:t~ 
Satyagrahs me.y take the form of nan-cooperation. When it does, it is 
not non-cooperation with the evil-doer but vith his evil deed. This is an 
important d:tst:1nct1on. The Aatyagreh1 cooperates vith the evil-doer in what 
is good, fer he has no hatred for him. On the contrary he has nothing but 
friendship for him. Through coo:perattng with him 1n 'What is not evil, the 
"" 
.:>c..o!'·!nnth Dhe-:·ta!l.1 '!'he 11 cs d..'li.i (AhmedabadJ NavaJivan Publishing House, l 1 p. 133. 
14n&",,laa, April 29, 19391 p. 101, quoted in Dhawan pp. 133-134. 
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Sotyegra:.-.a may at tulles take the f0:rr:1 of fasting. 'When it does, there 
is to be :s.o trace of self in the mot5.ve. The fvst should be pro:npted by the 
high.est a.e~rotion to duty and love for the opponent. It should ai.."11 at purify• 
1ng oneself, fur lecJ~ o:': capacity ti:; ce>nvl:nce tl1e op?)onent sho~rs def'eet 1n 
oneself. It should seek to ini'luence the opponent by converting him, not bf' 
coercing him to do sornethine again.st his conviction. Mahat"ta Gend!'l:l was 
&e;ain.~t personal gains. !·Ie h.elO. that :tt ws ri.othing short of intimidation 
and the result of ignorance. According to him, &'Uffering even unto death, 
und .f;herefore, even through a perpet®l fast is the lsst weapon of a satya• 
grahi. This is the last duty mi.ich is open to him to perform. It should 
be 1:1 the nature of ]!rS.yar for purity and strength and })()'We:- fran God. 
Mahatma Ganrihi had undertalren several fRsts tor public causes. The most 
important of ell was the cm.e which he took in eo;.mection with the Har1.1an15 
cause in Muy 1933· This f'ast is called the •E:Ptc Fast." Under the leader• 
:lh.ip of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the untouchables of Ind.1a demanded se~rate elee-
torates to elect their own representatives to fight for their rights 1n the 
Indian legislatures. Thia, they believed would put an end to their social, 
econanic and political ills under which they wre suffering for centuries. 
The then British Prime Minister, Rem.say Macdonald had conceded their demand. 
But Mahatma 0.T"2.dh11 who was 1n jail at that time opposed it, saying that 
that canmlm.al awrd wac injurious to the i.mtou.chables for it would keep 
them forever in backwardness an.d disrupt the strength of the Hindus. Since 
the British Government was unconvinced and adamant in their stand, Mahatma 
Gandhi declared t'l:lat he would resist the British communal award even with 
15 Peo~le of Gcd 
his Ute and went on a fast unto death. He tasted tar twenty one days and 
was literallY' knocking at death's door. '?o save his lite 1 a canpranise tor-
muia based on incnaaed representation. to the untouchables was substituted 
tn the place of the cammmal aVB.l'd. Thus Mahatma Gandhi bad demca.strated 
the etticac7 of fa.sting tor CClllllCll good. He declared: "The f'aet wa.s an 
uninterrupted twenty ane daJ'8 pr'IQ'er whoae effect I can feel even now. I 
mow now more tull7 than ever that there is no prayer without fasting, be 
the latter ever so little. "16 
Satyagaha in the political sphere assumes the form of civil disobedi-
ence. It is for this form of satyagraha that Mah.at.ma Gandhi became most re• 
puted. Civil Disobedience means mass nsiatance an a nan-violent basis again 
the goverment when negot1at1cms and constitutional methods have tailed. It 
is called "civil" because it is non""'Violent resistance by people Who are 
ordinaril.1' law-abiding c1tlzensJ also because the lava which they choose to 
diSO'beY' are not moral laws but cnly such as are harmtul to the people. It 
is civil also in the sense that those who bnak the law are to observe the 
greatest courtesy and gentleness 1n regaz'd to those Who en:torce the law. 
!hey are even to seek not to embarrass the oppanent. 
Caaplete civil disobedience is a state of peacetul 
rebellicm - a retuaal to obe;y ever.y single state-
made law. It is certatnq more dangerou.s than an 
a.med rebellian. ~or it can newr be put down 1f 
the civil resisters are prepared to face extreme 
hardahipa. It is based UPOl1 an implicit belief in 
the absolute etticiency of innocent suffering. :83" 
noiaelessl.1' going to prisan a civil resister ensures 
a calm atmosphere. The wrang-d.oer wearies of wrong-
doing in the absence ot res18'tance. All pleasure 
is lost when the victim betra;ys no resistance.17 
i~' Nsp::tj.qJ.ent Resist§p.c!, p. 315. 
~·, p. 172. 
When a government is corrupt and demorali7.es tr.e :peo::>le, resistance to 
such government can also be shown on n nation-"!trideo scale. !t l"!ey t'.len take 
the form of non-eooperation vith the government .. Ma '.he..tI!t3 Gandhi lfltm.c'led 
series of civil disobedience movements again.at the British L"'ldian govern.~ent 
during 1920-22, 1930-34, and 19"-0-44. Non-eooperatio:n may ex::!_)?"ess itself' 1n 
giving up titles sad honors bestowed by the government, resignation fran gov• 
e:rnment service, withdrawal frau the police and military, non-peymeri.t of 
taxes, boycott of courts, schools and legislat>.Jres, and rurning psrallel in• 
atit"J.tio:ns to perform these functions. 
Civil Disobedience demands an the part of the people d1sc1pl:tned group 
action, infinite capacity for suffering without retal:tat1.on., and strict 
obedience to leaders. They have to be taur,h.t, for example; cooperation, 
ea:mnl.ll'lal unity, fearlessness, consideration. for the sod.el good, self-help 
and resoureef'ulness, and have to have physiea.l, mental and moral strength. 
These thinga could be achieved, Mahatma Gand::J.i poi!i.ted out, oo ly through V3r• 
ious forms ot constructive endeavor, sueh as worki:rlg for econadc self-suf-
ficiency in villages, education, abolition of drink and tmtouchabil1ty, 
ccmm:unal con.cord, uplift of wauen, sanitation, hygiene, improved diet, child 
welfare, and so on. Ia the political field, therefore, satyagrah.a is not 
Wldertaken cm. a. temporary basis. It presupposes day to day non-political 
constl"llCtive work aiming at the all-round developnent of the in.dividual from 
the cradle to the grave. 
Iio doubt, Mahatma Ge.ndh11 based on the experience he gained 1n South 
Africa in fighting against that government through noo.-vtole:nce was able to 
launch the Civil Disobedience mmrements in India from tin1e to time a.gain.st 
t'l-\e 'Rrit:t~:i. i;"'7er.n:nnnt :?11d S"..tcceedeti iii achieving tangible results. But it 
ftwt:Wg, civil diaobedienee and its prerequisitee bot..11 in :political and nca-
political i'ie.lde etc.~ wre expl.ain.ed briefly hut cleorl.Y with oue regard to 
father we l>1wen1 or Prime Minister, of Po:rbe:nder, lttter of n.em•by Ra.jkot, 
an.cl lt;t,er ~ill ot Wanknner. T"nc Gandhis were cf the Modb Bania subdivision 
of the Va ishya, or merchant ce ste • 
The Modh Bania s, 
like other merchant castes, held to a nonviolent 
ethic suited to commerce, and to ascetic standards 
which often supplied the moral equivalent of a 
Protrlstant ethic tor Indian merchant castes. 
Kethiawer was strongly influenced by the Vaish-
navites, with additional influences from Jain• 
ism • the ~ost nonviolent of Indian sects.19 
H1s mother, Putl1bai1 had protol.md :J.ntluence over Mohandas Gandhi. 
Unlike his father, Karemchand, Gandhi's picture of his mother is of wireliev-
ed holiness and purity. In his autobiography he writes that she lett an out-
standing impression of saintliness upan his lll8m0l'J'• She was deeply rel1giou.s. 
GandhiJi admitted the tact thet whatever purity was found in him was derived 
fran his mother and not his tether. 
Likewise, his t1ret teacher of nai.-violence was his wife, Kasturba1. 
J. s. Holyland, in MahaH!t @:91dgi, edited by Radhakrishnan, quotes the follow• 
ing passage: 
I learnt the lesson of non-violence tran my Wite, 
'When I tried to bend her to my will. Her deter• 
mined resistance to my will an the one hand, and 
her quiet submissicm. to my stupidity involved an 
the other hand, ultimately made me ashamed ot my-
self and cured me ot my stupidity in thinldng I 
was born to rule over her; and in the end she be• 
came my teacher in non-violence.20 
~.ae non-violent ideal imbibed b;y Gandhiji was derived essentially tran 
the Baghvat Gita and fran Jesus' Serm0t-i on the Mount. It could also be 
181. Victor Woltenste1n, '.lihe Reyol!l,ti9Q!!£Y Persmlttx: ~· 'rrg!fsg, 
~i (Princeton, N.J.s Princeton University Press, 19 7 , P• 7!. 
19auetolph1 1'le New Qourye, p. 105 quoted 1n Woltenstein, p. 74. 
20Q,uoted in Dhawan, PoU,ti;al Philoso:ebJ of ff@b!W. gepdh1 1 p. 131. 
traced to the vritings of' 'l'horeeu, Ruskin, and more especially Tolstoy. 
But hi'oJ preetic~l application. of it in the social and Political spheres was 
ent ue ly his ow.r1. 
CHAP'I'm III 
nIDIA 1 S NON •VIOLFifl' S'l'RUGGLE FOR INDEPDIDENCE 
WHY DID IT flJCCEEDf 
The flag of the Indian Unioa waa raised to job. those of fifty-four 
other member nations at the headquarters of the United Nations at Lake Success, 
, 
New York, whn. India f'1nall.y became b.dependent oa August 15, 1947. Meeting 
in an exultant yet solem:a mood, the Constituent Assembly of India paid tribute 
to Gandh1J1, sent friendly greetings to the new sister state of Pakistan, and 
observed tvo minutes of silence for patriots who had died for India's freedan. 
Lord Mountbatten became Govemor-genera.l of the new dallinion of the Onion of 
India and Javaharlal Nehru. the f'irat Prime Mtn.ister. The Indian communities 
in the West Indies a:ad South Africa celebrated the Independence Day with 
parades and displays of the two new dan1nions. Participating 1D. the flag• 
hoisting ceremony for free India in London, A. v. Alexander, who had been a 
member of the Cabinet Mission to India declared, "The In.di.an Jtnpire dissolves 
- the British Canmonwalth of free nations welcOllles two free peoples into 
their association. "21 
In more ways th.a» one 1 the story of the Indian 1ndependence is unique 
both for India and the world. The ccm.tributicm.s to the :freedan of India 
were mm:cy' and manifold. In this ch.apter an attempt is made to deal with sane 
21 
T. Walter Wallbank, A Short Histgr of Ind\a and Pakistan, 
(A Mentor Book, Nev American Library, 19 5 , p. 227. 
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of those contributions Elnd their sources. 
Richard B. Gregg wrote : 
In 1947, after twenty six years of nonviolent struggle 
under Gandhi's leadership, l.ndia won her political 
freedom from Britain.. Not a single Briton, so far as 
I know, was killed by Indians as part of this struggle. 
It \Ills the Indians who volUD.tarily endured the necessary 
deaths and suffering. '!'his was the first time in the 
history of the world that a great empire had been 
persuaded by nonviolent resisteace to grant freedan to one 
ot its subJct countries. Of' course, as in all great 
and complex events 1 there were many reasons for the 
result, but the nonviole:m.t method is what eventually 
unified all Indians and gave them the necessary self• 
respect, self-relimiee, courage and persistence, and 
also resulted 1n mutual respect and good feeling 
bet-ween Great Britain and India. at the ead.22 
There is no doubt whatsoever that it was the nan.-violent character of 
!the struggle that did the miracle. It ts therefore interesting to know the 
~orking of the mass nonviolent resistance as such. 
Th.ere is a close ro::semblau.ce betwen war and non-violent mass struggle. 
tl:t is said by great authorities on the science and art of war that the object 
bf war is the mind of the enemy camaand and gover.mnent, not the bodies of their 
~roops. The balance between victory and defeet turns w mental impressions, 
~ only inairectly on physical blows. Napoleon stated that "m war, the 
. 23 
11oral is to the physical as three is to one." War seeks to demoralize the 
opponent 1 to break his will, to destroy his confidence, entbusiam and hope. 
Nonviolent resistance demoralizes the opponent only to reestablish 1D him a. 
:w.ew moro.lo that is finer beceuse it 1e basea on sou.ttder values. Non-violent 
resistance does not break the opponent' a will but alters it. It does not 
•'.12 
c; The POfl!t: ot Nan.vi~ce, p. 28. 
2\ichard B. Gregg, ~ Pg::!!f of Ngnrtgleip.se, p. 13 1 quoting Lieut. Gen-
eral August van Caemmerer, Th! Develment ot strategical Se1ence,(Rees, 1905) 
destroy his confidence 1 enthusiasm and ho:i.ie but transfers them to a :finer 
purpose. 
Violence always leads to cowiter-violence and cannot be a lasting sol-
ution of conflict. 'l'he defeated nurses the grudge and waits :f'or a suitable 
0pportt.mity to wreak vengeance. Viole.nee thus creates greater evils than it 
seeks to cure. It arouses the beastliest passions of man and leads on f'ran 
injustice to injustice. Non"'V'iolence see.ks to redirect these divisive oppo-
sites into creative channels. It raise.a the conflict f'ran the destructive 
physical to the con.stru.ctive moral level. Sufteri».g love paralyzes more phy-
sical force 1 conciliates the op:ponen.t 8J1d leads to a settlement satisfactory 
to both the sides and in keeping with their self'•respect, it is available to 
either side in the conflict and will vindicate truth and justice on which• 
ever side they are in. a preponderating measure. It thus carries its own auto-
mstic check against misuse. On the whole 1 the destructive method of' violence 
is no substitute for satyagraha. The latter may work slow, but it does settle 
the canf'lict and establish the right even as the former perpetuates and, otten 
enough, establishes the wrong. 
Mahatma Gandhi had realized th.e relative merits and demerits ot both 
violence and nan""Viole:nce as means for effecting social and political changes 
and decided :l:n adopting the nan-violent means as the best lm.der the circum-
stances. The practii-:e of satyagraha could result ill a new f'om ot var - a 
non-violent, non-retaliatory war. But before this stage was reaehed 1 Gandhij 1 
maintained 1 all avellue s for peaceful resolution of the ccmf lict had to be ex-
plored 1 tor there wr.s i:;.o roan in the spirit of non-violent movements f'or stub-
born pride or re :f'use 1 to <-oo.:f'er. One ought to respect one's oppari.ent and 
avoid open breaks if possible. The :program as Gandhiji saw it 1 had fiw 
stages, end ~ carrying on. non-rtol4nt campa~s nh1>U.ld exhaust. all the 
poasibiU.ties at each before proceeding to the next. The ti:rzt stage called 
for a ut1lizatiCll of all the regul.ar cmstitutianal machinery eva1leble1 in-
cluding legislative debates, arbitreticn by third parties, and direct aegot1a• 
tians. U atte1" a l"easonable period, this seemed fri..dtless, the m0'1!mel'lt 
ws to ptu~~ :tl'!'to a st.age at agi.tatiaa, taking the cause to the people with 
~lets end speeches to dewlop a hetG1teMd awareness of \That the cmfl1ct 
was about. Ge.D.dh1 ws B"WGN that 1n t.otalit&rian societies methods of agita-
ticm 't."OU.ld have to be dU:rerent tran those possible under a more liberal gov• 
e:t:"l'lllleut, probably perf'omed through a netvork of eOlll!lmltcattons built u.p 
outside the :normal chamlela. 
It agitat:S.on failed to open the oppanent1 s mind, Oendhi<1i ncC!Dmded 
an ult:!matum, a doc\llJeBt drawn u.p by the leaders with the eon.sent ot the 
movetwm't 1s repnamtat1wa, listing the people'• needs end stating thnt cOB .. 
tinued oppos1ticm. voW.d produce aaae 80.rt ot d11'ect acttcm.. 1"b.1s phase, 
Gawllli.11 cttlled aelt•purltication. Its purpoae wes to develop ~ha!!!.10r the 
spirit of' hazmlassn.ess, tllO pre-requisite to actioa untainted with aelt• 
int~st. 6&t1881"8h1• Wft to pray and test, seeking to dtaccmn• whether 
pe:rbaps their own deticienci.es wre in pa.rt respcmatble tar the evils the7 
vi-sh to abolial1.e 1be7 were to ask themselves whether the7 were not too leek• 
ing ta self-respect to coaund the respect ot the opposition and ponder how 
the7 could avoid the pitfall ot reducing both sides to mere thtngs instead 
ot h\IDlln beings. 
1'be last stage of the camI&1sri vu acme form ot direct action: ecoaanic 
boycott, sit"""'<Ml strikes, ncm.•i:ie,.ment ot truces, mass n•d~tton. frat :public 
otticc, deliberate a!id orgaatz.:! disobedience to certain lavs 1 etc. Sme 
canbination of these measures would, it was hoped, so cripple the society 
that Gandhiji ccnmted hea~ily on his opponents' lack of prePEU'Qtian tor non-
violent methods and bevildermen.t about how to meet them, coupled with the 
SJ!llPElthY such tactics could arouse 1a servants Of authority like the :police. 
The ultimate result, if the opponent held out tmtil the bitter end, would 
be a canplete collapse of all order 1 and power would pass to the set,agrehis 
wo -would constitute a new govemment. 
Krisbnalal Shrldharani, an IniU.an Journalist and sociologist who knew 
the independence movement at first band, writes: 
Violent overthrov of the government baa been the 
only method :popular with the revolutionists irres• 
pective Of their creed, nationality or race. Al-
most to a mne instance, ell revolut:loas have 
resulted in camage. What is even more s1gn.1t'1cet, 
violence bas never stop_ped at the conclusion ot a 
revolution. It has had to be emplo,ed even dm1.Dg 
the aftermath, that is, when the replacement of the 
established order by the people's government has 
taken place. Born in. a welter of blood, revolution 
has also to be COJl8'IJrllltlted in. blood. 
In this carefull7 plotted and well established 
pattern ot revolution, the Oen.dhi struggle is per-
haps the first and oaly variation ••• 24 
Shridhareni points out that there were tw well mer:taed periods 1n the 
history of Mj£8.1 ( selt-go'ftmmat) movement when sat,agraha has served as 
the instrument Of the u.tire Iad:taa cammmit;y 1n its st1"Uggle against the 
state. The AU•India Hoa-'9'iolellt lfaa.-cooperaticm Movemat began in 1920 and 
continued tq> to the middle of 1922. The period that followed was, be says, 
one ot demoralizatian. 8D.d de spoadeJle7. When it subsided, various groups 
engaged in &Poradic outbursts of setya.graha tOUght for local or secondary 
24 m WithgU.t V&2.la£t. (Harcourt, Brace and Can:puq, New York, 1939) 
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issues. It was not until 1930 that a call f'or general "mobilization" was 
sent to the f'our corners ot India. Th.is vas successful and brought beneficial 
results to the Indians. 
The Non-cooperation. Moftment ot 1920-1922 deserves mentiaa, 1:n the 
moral warfare waged by Mahatma Gandhi to dislod.ge the British rule trcn !.nd 1a. 
During World War I Great Britain prmised Indians a share in the war 
reparations and the gran1; of Domin1aa status to India:ns if' India su.pported the 
British 1n their war effort by suppl7tng men. 6lld materials. Mahatma Gandhi 
believed it and at his in.stance, India made liberal contributicms to the war. 
When tbe war ended, :neither the pran.ised Daai:nim status nor the share in the 
war reparations was given to the Indians. On the other band stories of ill-
treatment and d1scrim1natiaa of the Indian soldiers by the British merely 
because they were ?n.dians reached Mia tn. ever increasing number. Mahatma 
Gandhi was thoroughly disappomted. To add to all this 1 the Rowlatt Canmittee 1 
appointed by the British government, recaranended drastic measures to curtail 
the f'reedan movement in India. Driven to desperation, Oandhiji called u.pon 
the people to of'f'er a sat,ag.raha. 
25 
A day was appomted for cm.plete Hartat as a sip of 
mouming. Bach village and. every city 1n the country 
was to stop all normal activity tor twenty-tour hours 
and ever;y adult was to observe a ta.at. streets were 
deserted and shop windows shrouded. Mass meetings were 
held ta the evening to denounce the act. Jadividuals 
were asked at thase meetings to sign a satygraba pledge 
which bound them to disobey the act aad such other 
lava as would be recamnended by the nat1c:malist high 
camnend. P1nal.ly huge processions marched through the 
main streets ot the cities shouting revolutionary 
slog&l'1s. 25 
Sbr1dharan11 War Withqy.t D<Usce 1 p. 125. The act here refers to the 
Rovl.att Act 'Which provided arbitrary powers of arrest of a suspected person. 
without warrant and of imprisonment without trial. 
How did the British government reactf Police and military were used 
to shoot at the unarmed crowds. At Delhi, Calcutta and Amritsar large crowds 
of people were tired on. On hearing ot a distu:rbance at P\mjeb, Gan.dhiji was 
going there to restore peace. He was arrested and thrown into prison. The 
people ot Amritmar, disappointed b7 the news of Gendhij;i' s arrest, held at 
protest meeting on. the 18th of .April, 1919. Scme 201000 people, unarmed 
and peaceful gathered together in the Jallianvalla Bag, a walled•in garden 
with onl7 one exit. A gruesane massacre took pl.ace at the instance ot the 
British. Shridharani gives a graphic description. ot this massacre: 
Suddenly, General Dyer, a British militaey otf'icer, 
arrived on the scene with f'1ft7 picked soldiers armed 
with machine gm.is. Re posted his troops at the only 
exit ot the w.lled •in garden so that no one could 
escape. Without a word of waming, he gave orders 
to tire. About 1,650 rounds of 8111l1Urd.tion. -were leveled 
at the peaceful gather:lng of men, vanen, and childttn. at 
close range. The holocaust was over in a few min.u:tes. 
When Dyer withdrew, saae 1 1200 dead and 3,600 wounded 
wre lying 1n the garden. 26 
The 'Whole country' was shocked and stt.mae<i at this blood bath. Mahatma 
Gandhi, horrified at this heartless c~ 1 suggested various steps to pro-
test against the government. 'l'he7 were: hugB. processions, mass meetings to 
p:rotest government action and picketing ot government buildings by vomen.. 'l'he 
govermnent tried to suppress the growing tension by coercive mee"sures as 
arrests Of the sat,agrehis, lath1 charges (cracking heads open with bamboo 
sticks), firing an crowds, and wholesale massacres. 
Richard B. Gregg, discussing the can.sequences of firing an un.azmed non-
violent resisters 1 gives the JalU.an.wallabag incident; as an example. 
--
Suppose one o! the of:f'icers loses his heecl or 
be l1ewa in "-k1ns an example" end teaehil:lg 
by terror am orders tlie soldiers to fil"e on 
the un&U."med nonviolent rea1aters 1 and many are 
wounded and killed. 1"he effect is :lndeed elec • 
trical. h immediate beholdfts ms.7 be terror-
strieken :f'or a short time. But the nevs :bwv1.t• 
ably' spreads, ad the ~lie indignation against 
the officer end the soldiers will be ow~ring. 
This was the case With the JalliaJlWll.sbag trapdf 
U. India. BJ' the manner ot their death, the 
hundred.a Who died thin.• did more to fu'rtber the 
ceuae or Xxadtan political freedaa tblln could 
the deaths of three tinlaa that ml'Jlber U. violent 
riottns or attack u,pm the anq. Rew Of tbs mas-
sacre •• a blow to llritiah :pa."estise throupou;t 
the world, as well &s to Dr1t1sh aelt-respect.27 
After the massacre of Jallianwall.abafh Mllhatma Gandhi launched the 
With ncm""91.olent direct action au a national scale vll.ich eame VfW':f close to a 
caaplete success mien the goverm:ient ws brought to o standstill. But, aue 
to the occurrence of vio1.ence wh!.ch tbs un:tra ined mobs showed here and there, 
Qendh131 was accused ot inciting the people to violence 1 tried and eateneed 
tar eight 19ars impriaonmen'.- by 011 Enslish jud.ge. 
llhil.e it is outside the purview al this stua.1 to gift a detailed account 
ot the Clvtl Disobedicm.ee Movement ot J.kthatma Gendh1 1n. his f'igb:t for treedm, 
&a1le lmpoztant l.andme.rks, besides the Rowl.&ti; Act •'tJBszeha 1181 be meatlanea. 
'l'he7 were i Non'"'91.ol.ent non-cooperatian, Augwst 11 1920, Se.lt ss:t~ba (or 
Dandf. Much,) Mal"Ch 12, 19301 Hon-viul.ent cooperat1cn, Dec. 31, 1931•34, 
~ . ~ Individual aet19,graha, Oct. 1940, and "'uit Inda Movement., Aug. 9, ).91l.2 .. 
27zm rmi: 9' Jismio;J&a. n. 16-Tr. 
28ror a detailed acconnt at Civtl Disobedtenee Movemtmt, aM l.:'1216'& 
~le fPJ.': lndsa• b7 Jagadlsb s. Selma, PP• 78-142. (Delhi: s. Chand & 
co::i9tl?J 
Mahatma Gandhi sp1r1tual1zed politics. 110endh1 once said: You and I 
}lave to act on the political platform fran a spiritual side and if' this is 
29 
done, w should then conquer the conqueror". According to him the non""Viole? It 
struggle -was a struggle of good again.st evil and the f'oree behind 1t was soul 
force. 
It should be remembered that the success of the moral warfare ot Mahatma 
Gendhi was due to his personality. He ea.ught the !msgiaatian of the people 
not only by his teachings but also by his activities. To the millions of the 
masses of India he was a saint 8D.d a Mab.a.tma (great soul). He was regarded 
as en incarns.tian of God. He vore a loin cloth. 30 He controlled his palate; 
led a strictly celibate life af'ter his thirty-sixth year. He prayed &ad. fast• 
ed frequently. He walked an foot tran village to village. Above a.11, though 
he was fighting tor a noble cause unarmed, he be.de his followers not to raise 
even a finger age.inst the opponent. Hence he was ranked with Buddha, Mahavira, 
end Jesus Christ and he acquired e halo of sacredness around him. His emer• 
gence as a prophet of' the !ndien people or as a charimatic leader, out of a 
politician pure and simple haB been nurtured by the peculiar faiths, tradi• 
tions, and beliefs of the multitudes. Gendhi, the Mahs.tma, the result of mass 
psychology, is as s1gn1f1ca:nt as Gendhi, the statesman, the result of his 
individual nature and nurture. People's hearts enshrined him under a ha.lo 
and his con.sequent prophtttic role 1n turn endowed the straight-forward politi• 
cal struggle of the Indians with the richness and praf.'.tmdit;y of' a great sod.al 
29K.P • Karuna.karan, C•t:uitz and Ql.1!u!.ge 1.a Indian Pgl1tica; (New Delhi P~o;:1le~ Publishing House, 19~1). 157 1 quoting H.S.L. Polak :f.n M.K. Gandhi: 
§Peeche s ep.d Writings (Madras 1917) 
30aendh1's desire to identify himself' with tbe poor was the reason for 
this meagre dress. It geve him the image of sn ascetic and a saint to the 
people of India. But his critics called him en halt naked fakir (beggar). 
---
31 
movemen't. 
Heridas T. Muzumdar desc:ribea Gandh1J1 in these 'lrords1 
Mahatma Gandhi be loags not to India alone but to 
the whole world. IIe belongs not to our genera• 
tion alone, not to the twntieth century alone, 
but to posterity as well. In li:f'e as in death 
Gandhi has been revered by millions of his cau-
pe.triots in India and millions abroad. Most of 
us the present genaratian. look upon him as a great 
political leader. As such Gandhi would no doubt 
be classified with the great makers and moulders 
of nations • Cra11Well1 Napolean.1 Mazzini, Washing• 
ton and Lincoln. Future generations, however, 
will, I believe, recognize in Gandhi one of the 
greatest spiritual forces of all times. Whether 
we knew much or little about h:tm., this men in a 
loin-cloth &anehow remin.cled the men of the present 
generation, and will continue to remind future 
generations, of the great heights which the spirit 
of men can scale. 1.n. him we see an image of our 
higher eelf, of that nobler sieJ.t', of thllt nobler 
self which recopizes D.OID.-Violence and tl"llth as 
the law of our species.32 
Thus it ws Gandhiji' s technique of no.n""Violence and his own d)r.nam.ic 
personality which to a large extent, contributed to the resounding success ot 
the J.ndia 's struggle tor freedom. 
The world's largest colonial empire was dissolved peaeef'ull.71 changing 
1b.e history of the world. Whatever may be the various factors tbat could 'be 
cited tor this e:poeh making event, the final question remains: Was it the 
moral superiority of the British nation that impelled her to grcmt independenc111 
to India ultimately or was it her weakness end pusillanimityf 
Faced as they repeatedly have been with ever-growing nationalist move• 
men.ts of :revolt 1 al.l other UU>erialists have, on the contrary, resorted to 
31Shridh9re:!!!1 pp. 226-227. 
32 Mahatma Gendhif Peaceful Revol~~ (New York: Charleii Scribner's 
Sons, 19521, P• l. 
ever-increasing force and violence 1 have held 1n check or suppressed · such 
movements for a long time, and in the end have often perished vith them in 8 
canmon ruin. But tb.e British 1mper:1Plists actea (Ji~f'erently. Wnat they did 
wss slowly and relucta.utly gave way before the mounting :.e;itct:ton of Mahatma 
Gandhi's various eampa igns. But that was en~ugh: It ..ms enough to f..uahle the 
Indian nationalist movement to be con.o:ucted along predani:nantl.y non-t"evolut1cm.• 
ar:r lines, even to sane extent along parliamentary lines, wile achieving a 
sufficient minimum of progress to avoid discrediting those methods. 
Chester Bowles writes: 
No col.Ult%'{ profited more than England 1 whose empire, 
on which the sun never set," stretched trom the 
Atl.&ntic seaboard ot America to ~ island continent 
ot Australia. Its "brightest jewel," 1n Winston 
Churchill's words, ws lruU.s. Without India's enor• 
mous annual "contribution" to tr..e British econ.any, 
Churchill believed as late es 1935 that "one third" 
of the British POPillation. "would have to go down, 
out or under." •Ind:ta," he 88!ii 1 "was En.gland's 
J.aily bl"ead, that's all.• Yet by the middle ot the 
twentieth century India was free, and the British 
&a:pire had been largely converted into a Commonwealth 
of entirely independent nations. 33 
Certainl;y i't was not Great Britai:n'c weakness or her pusillanimity that 
canpelled her to grant inde:;rendenee to India. T'ne real reason lies elsewhere. 
It was the conscience of the British more than anything else that explains the 
1.Uliqueness of British transfer of po-.rer to the Indian hBnds. The British 
people have often achieved greatnees1 but never were they greeter than :tn the 
time and :manner of their leav-lng IncUa. Chester Bowles recalls in his book 
33Ambassp&or's Rfwrt 1 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954) PD• 48-49. 
For a valuable ex.Pension of this idea, see lle.nnah Arendt, ~ ~igins pt 
malltH':Hrurl!h (11ew York: Harcourt, Brace & World 1 Inc. 16, PP• 133•1341 
21 -221. 
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vb.St one of Gendhi' s followers told him regarding tbe grant ot f'reedan. to 
India by the British. 
One night I heard one of them say, "British 
terror was never relentless enough to succeed. 
At the crucial maneats it always found itaelt 
troubled with a bad conscience, and suddenly, 
when least expected, even with respect tor the 
individual Indian as a hllll&n being. A terror 
that never relented, that never ccmpranised 1 that 
was always free or doubts, migb:t have crushed us.34 
311. DJ4•1 P• 58. 
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. WRY INDIA IS NON-ALIGNED! 
Mahatma Gandhi danin.ated the politics of India 1 internal and internat1an. 
al, both during g.d. at';K;t: hie lifetime. 35 Bis gospel of non-violence per• 
vaded all aspects of life. It was not a tactical nan-violence confined to 
only one area ot life. lt embraced all of lite 1n a consistent and logical 
network at obligations. 
During his lifetime 1 Gendhij1 was the heart and soul of the Indian 
National Congress,, the political party which fought tor the achievement of 
treedaa on non-violent basis under the guidance and leadership of Mahatma 
Gandhi. ihe principles on which the Foreign Policy of the Indian Ne.ttonsl 
Congress was baaed duriDg the course of the IneU.a 1 s struggle for Independence 
were: 
l) strol18 opposition to imperialism; 
2) actiw s)'BlPllthy with and support to subject-peoples fighting for 
i'reedan and independen.ce 
3) hatred ot war and abiding desire tor peace 1n the vorldJ 
4) avoiding foreign entanglements as tar as passible; and 
5) working against racial discrimination. 
It takes no effort to see how logical and consistent these principles 
are with the Gandhian ideology of non-violence. These principles were 
35India had to use force to "ttle its problems of 1ntegf8.tion and bor-der dispUtes with its netghbors wh1eh conforms to Gendhian ].1l'1nCipJ.es. See 
Chapter v • 
•?A• 
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Qendhien. They wre enunciated b,- the Mahatma. They were adopted by his 
political party as guidelines for action 1n areas both danestic and tore i:gn. 
It is !mportant at this point to recall sane ot Gandhi's pertinent pro-
:nomcements on polities, gOftrmnent and democracy. This will 1llum:lmlte 
India 1 s f'oreip policy and pe~it its being vined 1n proper perspective. 
To quote Gandh1j11 
1'here is no escape tor a327 ot us save through 
truth and non-vio1-ce. I know that war is 
vrong, 1a an U'Clllitiga.ted evil. I know too that 
it has got to go. I fin:l-7 believe that freedan 
van through. blood ad or fraud is no freed an. 36 
I:n this statement, Gendhlj1 expressed the fact that the salvation of 
me:nk1nd itself lies 1n ~ and non-violence. He ccademned war as a great 
evil and pasaionatel.J' pleaded for its abolition. 'lo him real f'reedan was 
, 
and could be achieved by ~on-violence only, and not by treud and bloodshed. 
These though.ts ot the Mal48.tma, no doubt, did influence the struggle for 
India' a f'reedaa sad the *tion.' s outlook on the YOrld. 
At another occasion, Gandhiji reiterated the all-pervasive character of 
nOD.-violence. He said t 
'Nan-violence to be a creed has to be all-per-
vasive. I cannot be nan-violent about one 
activity of mine and violent about others. 
That would be a policy, not a lite force. !'( 
!fhis clearly explains Gandhi.11' s stand even 1n the realm of politics. IlfOD.• 
violence should embrace politics aa well. No wonder Gandhiji literally 
sp1ritual1zed politics. He lUted it fra:!l the quagmire of deceit, craftiness 
and chicanery to a higher and a nobler plane of morality and sanity. 
36.rhcmes MertOD., ed., Gydh1 gp. Nz-v1gl.gse, p. 52. 
37Ib1d 
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Gandhiji even talked about non-violence in greet nations. Re exhorted 
nations as well as individuals to imbibe the principles of non-violence and 
practice them. 
If they can shed the tear ot destruction, it they 
disarm themsel'V\'!5 1 they will autcmatically help 
the rest to regain their aan:tty. But then these 
great powers will have to give uP their 1mper1alis• 
tic ambitions and their exploitations of the so-
called uncivilized or aend.-civilized nations of the 
earth and revise their mode or lite. It means a 
complete revolution.. )8 
Hov did Gendhiji relate aon.-violence with demoeracyf Here is What. he 
said: 
Without the recoga.it:ton of non-violence on a national 
sea.le there is no such thing as a constitutional or 
democratic government. 39 
Democratic government is a distaat dream so long as 
non-violence ie not recognized as a living force 1 an 
inviolable creed, not a mere policy. 40 
In. bofih his prolific vrit:f.ngs and his speeches, Mahatma Gandhi carried 
his message of non-violence across the masses ot India and the nations of 
the world • 
Atter India became an il'J.depend.ent nation on. the 15th August, 194 7, 
free to tollov her own polic7 and exercise her influence over world atfairs 1 
she lost no time in putting into practice the ideals she bad cherished so 
long. !he t:lve principles of foreign. policy admbrated by the Indian Natton.• 
al Congress under Gendh1J:l's leadership were implemented 'Without any 
material change. Thus, there could be no two opinions, on Gandhij11 s 
influence an India's foreign policy. 
Arne Nae ss describes the :f.n!'luence of GandhiJi in Indian Politics 1n a 
chapter entitled •Gandhi after India's political freedom• as follows: 
In an India which in 1947 had gained its Political 
f'reedan 1 there w.s no pl.ace for Ga:ldhi to act as a 
politician; yet his prevailing influence became 
even greater th.an it had been before. lie exerted a 
powerful influence on Nehru and the other Congress 
Party leaders, and his religious influence, in 
Indian culture was imm.eesureble. 41 
In the glowing tribute that NehrU paid to Gan.dh1J1 a:tter his death, 
one can see his ow eilmissian ot the impact ot Gandh1j1' a :lnflue:ace an the 
42 
sub-continent of Indie. 
A glor;.r has depa't"ted 1 " wrote Jawarhal Nehru, "and 
the sun that varmed and brightened our lives has 
set and we tthi'V'er 1n the cold and dark. Yet he 
would not have us feel this way aftel"' all that 
glory that w saw, for all these ~s that maa 
'With divine f'ire changed us also, and1 such as 
we are, we have been moulded by him during these 
years and out at that divine tire ~ at us also 
took a small spark which strengthened and made us 
work to aaae extent an the l:tnes that he fashioned; 
and so if' w pre,iae him our words seem rather mall 
and if' we praise him to sane extent we praise our• 
selves. Great men and end.n.ent men have mcnuments 
in brcm.ze and marble set up for them, but this man 
of' divine f'ire managed 1n his l:ttetime to becCJlle 
enmeshed 1n millicna and millicns ot hearts so that 
all of us have becane S<JlleWhet of the stu:tf that he 
vas made of 1 thougt..: · to an il'lfinitel.y lesser degrwe. 
He spread out O"ftr India 1 not 1n pala,ce s only or 1ii 
select places or 1n assemblies, but 1n every hamlet 
41 Q.ap.oh& !pd jibe HJJ&Jlar Ag, (N.Y.: Bedminster Press, 1965) 1 p. l()C). 
42t.tahlltme Oendhi vas assassinated on J'anuar)" 30, 194$. {see 'Wallbank's 
H1stsza of' lad.ia !iQ4 laklpm, p. 246, and J.ouis Fischer's !fhe LUe of 
Maf:.atma 9!mdhi• New York.I Iis.r:per & Brott.era, 19501 Cha~r 11 Death Before 
Prayers, pp. 3•11) 
and hut of the lowly aad of those -.mo suffer. 
He lives 1n the hearts ot millions and he will 
live for immet"..11oriel ages. 43 
A close study Of the independent principles of the Caagress policy be-
tore and after the etteimnent ot Independence indicates no remarkable differ-
ence 1n the basic approach. The main reason of' this steady and firm growth 
ot the Foreign policy, perhaps, is that the man after 1925 ,,ho gaye the Con-
gress aDd India a definite lme of action to follow with regard to intern.a-
tional issues is Jawaherlal Nehru. It was b.e who in.stilled into the Indian 
Na.tional Congress an international bias. It is true that the Congress glad• 
ly accepted his stand on pract1call.y all international issues; tor example 
cm. the Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish question, Italian invasion of Ethiopia, 
World War II, and the issues of Palestilte•Israel issue 1 aoa,
44 Indonesia, 
Ghana wld Hungary. From 1925 until his death,45 he hes primaey res:ponsibilit 
tor dratt:lng the reaolutiaa.s on India's Foreign Policy for the Congress. 
Arter India became 1.ndepe:n.den.t, :1e became both Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister. Naturally, therefore, the Foreign Policy of the Indian O<wernment 
was greatly influenced by Pandit Nehru. Thus, while the spirit 8Jld philo• 
sophy ot India's foreign policy was provided by Mahatma Gandhi, the eon.tent 
and direction. came fran panditJ1. 
Who was Neb.rut Whet qualifications a».d training did he have to shape 
India's foreign Policyt 
Vhcent Sheeu gives the a11.swer: 
43Jawabarlal Nehru, M!Qa'tma qyp.h1, (Banbay: Asia Publishing House, 
1949) 1 P• 154. 
44 
The rumexa'tioa of Goa by force was according to GAndhian principles. 
See Ch. V. l>• 49. 
45Ja'WAhalal Nehru died on Mey 27, 1964. 
'Declared purposes are one thing, taher:ttecl pre-
dispositions another; but Nehru's 1dees in for-
eign policy ere also persoaal, resttl'tiag frau his 
total experience 1 including t.r~vel, reading end 
reflection. He hes be~ intellectually concerned 
with foreign, af'f'eirs tor f'orty years an.d more. 
This could not be se:td of any other Indian J.ead~r 
• not even of Gandhi • and constitutes a high de• 
~e of prepa1-ation for his tosk. 46 
Born on November 141 18891 Jmmharlal Nehru w8s the only son of the 
late Motilel Nehru, a renO'lmec1 lawyer end ot one time leader of t:!le Opposi-
tion in the Cen~ral Legislative Assembly. At the age of 13 he became a mem-
ber of the Theosophical Society, but h1's 1ntel'est 1n this subject soon ebbed 
out. At 15 he was taken to Englancl em edmitted to the public school at 
Harrow. From Harrow he went to Cambridge ~mere he took his tripos in 
natural sciences. During his stay in Cambridge he took part in. the activi-
ties of the Can1bridge Majlis (an organization of Indian students). He thea 
studied law and was called to the Bar :f'ran the L-mer Temple. On his return 
to India in 19121 he en.rolled h1mse lf' es e11 edvocnte ot' the Allahabed High 
Court. 
On his return to India," writes Sheean, "he had 
almost torgotwa his native Urdu tcague e.d took 
his place in the net1one 1 movement 1 at the Bank• 
ipore Caa.gress, Christmas, 19121 as a writer en.d 
spealter ot Eaglish. Eagl.1sh was then, and was to 
remain for a long time 1 the :real languege nf the 
national movement. 47 
According to Shee&n Nehru's tde•a 1n foreign affairs were developed 
duriag the long 19&rs of study and reflection \."h1ch ~ceded his advent to 
46 
Nehru: The Ye;rs 2f' Power (New York: Ralldau House, 1960) 1 pp. 130-131. 
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power. lie rew.els the fact that Nehru's ideas 1n foreign policy were evolve 
in ja.111 'Where, all told, he spent sane nine years of his maturity. Nehru 
was, it should be admitted, treated with leniency by the British during his 
incarceratio..'1. I'lehru read incessantly while in jail. He could receive 
books, periodicals and ·- most of the time ... even lei;tt;fts. While he wa& 
in solitary confinement both his mind ana body were active. He developed 
tb.e yoga principles :frob. & book and atuck to their :Practice till the end ot 
his life • In the cm~ of' othar leade1·s of the India». National Movement 1 
he gave end received food for thought in. the course of uaending coaversation 
wnic11 served also to fhl&rpen the wits ot the participants. 
Nenru's rich experience 8Jl.d :fund of knowledge came aot only fran his 
study and retlecticm.. 'l'b.ey came fl'Ol.!1 his wide foreign. travel as well. He 
was a great globe -trotter. In 1926 t...e sailed f ·Jr &Urope to recuperate his 
health. iie travelled 1u Italy, SW1tzerland 1 Brussels, Germany and Russia. 
Ile attended the Erussels Con.ference of Oppressed Natioaalists as the of:f'ici• 
al delegate or the Indian Natio.n.al Congress. Ia Febrwiry 1935 1 be was re-
leased fi-aa Jail. lie took his sick wife to Badenweiler, the German health 
resort. 48 Nehru repre seated India at the Ccmmonwalth Confe:nm.ce 1n London 
in 1949. Re went to .America. on. a goodwill mission. in October - November 194 • 
He attended the C(llftanwealth Foreign Ministers' Canterence at Colanbo in 
January 1950. He visited Indonesia in June 1950 and attended the Canmon-
wealth Prime Ministers' Conference in January 1951. Nehru visited Africa, 
~ehru's vite was Kamala. Re married her 1n 1916 and was deeply de• 
voted to :ier. She died there in Feb. 25 1 1936. Mrs. Indira Gaadh11 India 1 s 
Prime M:t~iE'lt.-..r todfly1 wes thl!!1r only' daughter. 
EgyPt, China and many other Asian eoun:t;ries cm difi'erent dates, too :numerous 
to mention. These travels brought him rich experiences, lmowledp and mas-
tery over international problems. Ia consequence Nehru became the chief arch 
itect of India's foreign policy, after many 79&rS of conscious preparation 
1n deep study 1 wide trawl and serious retlectian.. 
Whet is India's foreign policJ'f In a speech delivered at the Constitu-
ent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, Decamber 4, 1911-7 1 Nehru said: 
'ro cane to grips with the subJect, 1n its econaaic, 
political and various other aspects 1 to try to under• 
stand it, is what ultimately matters. Whatever policy 
you may lay down.1 the art ot con.ducting the foreign 
attairs of a country lies in finding out what is moat 
advantageous to the countey. We may talk about 1nter-
nat1cmal goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk 
about peace and freedom and earnestly mean. What we say. 
But 1n the ultimate aul.yais 1 a govermnent f'unctian.s for 
the good ot the countey it gowraa and n.o government 
dare do azqthiq which in the short or long mu is 
manifestly to the dtsadvant.age at that country. 49 
So India's foreign. policy vaa, f'ran the veey beginnhg, directed to 
"wat is most advantageous to the country, or 1n other tems, to its material 
bAi;erests. Ftmdamentally this meant preservation of her newly won treedau 
on the one han.d and achievement of tmity and economic develol!Beat cm the 
other. India is a developing nation. Her policies must therefore be differ• 
ent f'ran those ot a well developed nation. !his :la true ot the policies of 
the tmderdeveloped nations 1n general. 'ro quote J.B. K:ripa.lani: 
The tmderdeveloped As1o""lt\tricaa e0U11tries which have 
recently achieved treedan have so many political, 
econ.ante and social problems of their own. that they 
feel they must con.tine their attention. to the solu• 
tion. ot these rather than dabble 1n partisan inter ... 
national politics. They do not want to annoy any of 
49Jawaharlal Nehru, Jnd•:Pen<i•!!ce aad After, (New Yorkr John Day Co., 
1950 ), p. 2o4-205. 
of the big powers. Furthermore, nations which 
have recently east ott the Western yoke are not 
quite SUl"e that the colonialists have altogether 
abandoned the idea ot rege.ining their old dcni-
n.ant position, given the opporttmity. 'f.b.ey 
therefore utilize the anti•1mper1al1st assertions 
of Russia to keep in check fresh ambitions ot the 
West. At the same time they are not enamored of 
the political and eeao.an1c set u.p in ccmaunist 
Russia or China. They therefore remain neutral. 
Further, they do not bel1ew in the apostolic 
mission. ot reforming the world that both sides claim 
tor themselves, one more fanatically and more ag-
gressively than the other. No natian. has been 
cCIDlllissioned by God or His substitute, Historical 
Necessity, to reform the world. 
These are good reasons for neutrality as between 
the two blocs, and they appeal to India. There• 
fore, the policy of' the Indian Government in this 
respect is generally accepted by the nation.50 
Ind 1a' s foreign policy is based on the phrase ~ch Sheela, tt which 
was first mentioned in the Joint statement issued by the Prme Ministers of 
India and China on J\m.e 28, 1954. The five principles as stated 1n it were: 
1. Mutual respect for each other's te?Titorial integrity and saver-
2. Non-aggressionJ 
3. Non-interference 1n each other's internal affairs; 
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 
5. Peaceful existence. 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, 1n a radio broad-
cast, bad noted that the :Pan.ch Sheela was based an the message of Buddha and 
called upon the people to dedicate themselves to Buddha's teaching. 
50"For Principled tieutraUtT' • Foaig Affa1£a, October, 19591 
pp. 56-57. . 
Speaking on the Indian way in Internations.l 
Affairs, Mr. Nehru in December 1956 stressed 
that the Indian people seemed to have developed 
a tradition to do things peacefull)".... If 
there vas ~ message which India ottered to 
other countries, it was this message of doing 
things by peaceful methOds to solve any prob• 
lem. 51 
When other nations, especially those of the West, indulge in power politics 
end use of' force for solving their problems arising out of international 
relations, India follows the princ1.ples of non-violence, of Ahilusa, and the 
dictates of peace and love expounded by Buddha, sane twnty five btmdred 
years ago. Wallbank points out that well•1nf'ormed observers in the West 
have been impressed b7 the spiritual motivation of Indian foreign policy. 
"Professor Norman :Brown has cmmented that "it is 1n the light of Ind.ta' s 
. 52 
moral ideaU.am" that her approach to world affairs must be viewed.• 
Vincent Sheean pnfers the word "uncanmitted" to describe the foreign 
policy of India. To h:lm this word is more precise than e:ny other word for 
this purpose. He writes: 
A considerable number ot words have been either 
coined or turned trail their or1ginal uses to 
characterize Nehru's foreign policy. The camnon• 
est jou.malistic description ot it is "neutralism" 
referring to the position of friendliness which 
India esS\ll'les with regard to both sides 1n the 
"cold war" between Russia end America. It is not a 
good word because it states an untra.th: India is not 
neutral, and has in tact deployed an incessant 
activ1t7 tor tvelve Jears 1 besides constantl.7 vot-
ing cm the questions in dispute when they reach the 
5J...r.w. llallbank pp. 309-310, quoting lp41JUQi£1b (Washington D.c. 
Indian lbbassy) 1 No. 851, December 29, 1955· 
52Ib1d quoting, WI• Norman Brown, "ag&M Ma3i1cm.!l Ideals f9dal" 
Mary Keatings Da.s Memorial lecture, Colum.bia University. 
United Nations. Whet this deplorable word 
really means is that !iehru. has steadfastly 
refused to commit himself' in advance - by 
means of treaties, alliances, bl:lnd pledges 
of this or that kind - tO'.'Srd the activities 
of other nations. 
Hence we get another word 1n current use tor 
the past four or five years: "uncommitted." 
It -11as Adlai Stevenson's word . originally 1 I 
believe, but has been a.bsorbed into contemporary 
Journalese with. avidit7, as being less negative 
artd there:f'ore less of'f'ensive than •neutralism." 
This word does contain the truth India and a 
considerable number of other tree countries in 
Asia and Africa stand tor, but it bas always 
the danger of suggesting that older negative, 
"noncommittal" than it is "neutral,'' and it 1s 
anl;y "uncaamitted" up to the time when comm.its 
itself, as 1t does on each question when it 
arises. 
In other words, India's central and cansistent 
claim in foreign aff"a1rs 1s the right to make uP 
its mm mind on every case, both in a.ceordance 
with the merits ot the case and of India's nation• 
al interest 1 without regard to what other nations 
or canbinations of nations may say or do.53 
Nehru's own conception of 1.nd.ian foreign :policy, according to Sheean, 
was that it must adhere to three main parallel lines 1 governed b;y three 
purposes. 'l'.hese were r nonalignment 1 the PQrsuit of peace when possible, and 
the national interest of India itself'. 
It is interesting to note the variet7 of roles played b7 India on the 
intemational scene mt.der these purposes. Under nan.alignment, l'11dia has 
avoided all .. entangling alliances," end military pacts. The celebrated 
Panch Sheela or five principles ot mutual respect ar..d nanL'lter.f'erence formed 
the basis of agreements with Cammmist China end other counti•ies. Un.der the 
second purpose - the pursuit ot peace when possible - India has played a 
considerable role on the vorld stage. 
One of' the reasons that Nehru attributed to the non-alignment policy 
of India was that any attempt on India's part to influence intemational 
relations would be inettective at this stage of the country's developnent. 
In a speech deliftred at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), Nev Delhi, 
March 8, 19481 Nehru declared: 
'Now 1 surely the responsibility tor the deter1o?"• 
ation of the international situation might lie 
with sane Powers. In Innis, our responsibility 
is very little. We may have alQted well or badly 
on the international stage, but we are not, frank• 
ly speaking, influential enough to affect i.."lter• 
national events veey much. Therefore, U a gree.t 
deterioration has ta.ken place in the inter.national 
sphere it is not due to our Policy. 54 
Notwithstanding Nehru 1 s admission at Inaia' s eunperetive laek of 
in:f'luence in conventional power tems, on the world's diplanatic stage 1 India 
has played effectively the role at a mediator end emtseary tar peace. His-
torians like T. Walter Wallbank accept this tact as beyond dispute: 
In addition to her anti-col.oniallrn and her concern 
for security and tor Asian peace end solidarity 1 lhdia 
has been eager to use her intluence and leadership 
in reducing areas of friction 1n the world. Elle 
has been active as a mediator in disputes, emcouraging 
disarmament • especie.lly 1n nuclear weapons - and has 
stood before the nations ~ a disinterested party 
world.ng for the caamon good ot humanity. While there 
has not been canplete agreement 1n Western nations 
about the over-all balance sheet of this role, it is 
indisputable that India has exerted tremendous 
weight in the affairs of the world. Her hand was 
active in the Korean am1stiee 1 1n the admission ot 
new members, es:peciall.7 1n 1955 1 to the United Nations, 
1n the truce secured in 1954 in Indochina, and in re• 
ducing sane ot the tensions stemming frm. differences 
dividing Canmmist China and the United states •55 
54Nehru, Inde}?!ndence and. After, p. 210. 
55A ::lhOlji H1st9£[ gt :tndia aDfl :!'3Mstau• P• 308. 
Under the third declared purpose of the Indian foreign policy, to wit, 
the national interest of the country itself 1 
there cane a variety ot considerations ranging 
trom internal de'ftloi:ment under the Five Year 
Pl.8ns to unity, independence, defense and inte• 
gration.1 in which 'What happens inside and near• 
by must inevitably haw SQlle influence on the 
actions taken tar afield. 56 
India's action in the annexation. of Goa, her fight against Pakistan over 
Ka sbmir and the border dispxt;e with Red China tall under this category of 
India's foreign policy.57 
Now the question may be asked, is India justified 1n following such 
a policy of non-eJ.igmaent in her intematicmal relation.sf Yes. India's 
foreign policy ot non-eU.gnment could be justified fran maey points of' view. 
For example 1 Dr. Frank C. Chookolingo says: 
'This policy can best be understood in the 
light ot the comrtry's past history, its geo• 
graphical locaticm.1 its cultural toandations, 
its present problems, and its future goals. 5S 
l'ncU.a is an ancient country. "As a way ot 11.f'e, as an l!b.p1re 1 as a 
political confederacy, the country ot India has been in existence since about 
4000 B.C. •59 Even from the period of recorded history, great emperors, with 
56Sh.eean, pp. 126-127. 
57The author of this thesis explains this purpose in terms of Gandhian 
idealogy. According to him the foreign policy at India newr swerved tran 
Gandhian principles, ewn though India vas constrained to use force to defend 
her national interests. See intra .• 
58WH! Ta ,l'nli4! Stm (New York: Exposition Press, Inc.,) p. 135· 
59~., p. 156. 
codes of conduct for national and international purposes existed. Ji'lmperor 
Asoka is an outstanding example. He renotmced war as an instrument of naticm.-
al policy and sought to extend the teaching of the Buddha throughout the 
JbPire in 325 B.C. This is India's past. This is India's tradition. The 
Pl"tsent refusal to join the power blocs constantly engaged in cold war and 
the preparations for a bot war at any 1'.lalUm.t should be looked at 1 among other 
things 1 frm the standpoint of India's past history and tradition.. 
A study of the geographical PoSition of I.ndia vtll also help to mi.der-
stand its foreign policy. Thia may be done fran two potnts ot view. First 
of all, India's Juxtaposition with the two most powerful communist countries 
- RusS'.f..a and. China, and second of au, India's position in the Indian Ocean 
area. 
If India joins the Western bloc, for instance, in the e"Nllt of a war, 
she is very vulnerable. Both Russia and China can easily attack India, 
taking advantage of her geographical proxmity. India's northern province of 
Kashmir is just a few miles awa7 from the southern boundaries of the Soviet 
Union. Her eastern province of Assam is contiguous with Chinese territory. 
This, th.en, is en important consideration which has militated against an 
Indian desire to join the West 1n the cold war. 
Next, how does Indian Ocean 1ntluence India's foreign pol1cy1 
"The destinies of the Indian Ocean end India are so closely 1nterwoven that 
it has appropriately been said whicllever power controls one controls the 
other. "6o Dr· Chookolinao point3 out that at the time ot the RCJD&n empire 1 
both Pax Ranena and the maritime strength ot tbe ?ndian ld.nss maintained 
peacef'ul. conditions 1n the Indian Ocean. Later, tbe Arabs acted as inter• 
60Ib1d., p. 158. 
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mediar1es for the tre.de between &lrope and the Orient. In 1453, Wen th.el 
Turks ce.ptured the Constantinople, the Western nations were f'arced to discc. 
alternative sea routes to continue their trade with India and the Far East. 
Columbus discovered America in 1492 1n an attempt to reach India by' sailing 
westward, since the Italian merchants refused the use of tl:»i! Mediterranean 
sea tor the S.Panish merchant ships to go to the Orient. For the same reason, 
Vasco da Gama discovered another sea route to India by sailing liest tran 
Portugal alcmg the African coast and the Caie of Goocl Hope. S1nce that time 
the control of the Indian Ocean has been 1n the hands of' natians of Western 
Europe 1 Portugal, Holland, France and Engl.and. England alone 1 it must be 
admitted, by virtue of her auperior naval strength, controlled the Indian 
Ocean for aamost two hundred years. But, after the second World a.r, British 
sea :power declined due to various reasons. A power vacuum has been created 
in the area of the Indian Ocean, since Britain has left it without a strong 
naval force. This is an invitation to aey other strong nation to covet the 
possession of India and to attempt to widen :I.ts area of influence. By ad.her• 
ing to the policy of n<m-aU.gnment, India, besides building up her own streng 
th, manages to keep herself ou.t of the colonial ambitions of e:ny power. 
How can India• s foreign policy be justified on the basis of :I.ts pre• 
sent conditions! India has such countless problems at heme that she can 
hardly a:.t'ford dabbling in the preparations for international wars - hot or 
cold. To mention only a f'ew of the many problems • very low per capita 
incme 1 a diehard caste system which divides rather than mites the Indian 
people, and the ill:lt.eracy of the masses - these are urgent end seriO'is 
problems which deserve the attention of its leaders. Could there be more 
valid Justification than this for India to decline to join the cold war 
blocs! Werner Levi correctly poi.."l.ts out this fact as :f'ollows: " ••• internal 
p>..·oblems are overwbel:ming. Their solution demands such a concentration of 
effort that occupation with foreisu policy looks to many Indians like a 
61 luxury.• 
Criticisms ot India's foreign policy are many. Sane say India should 
get off the fence. She exploits both sides and gets all sorts of a:l.d f'rom 
them and giws nothing in return. Sane others would say, "If India is not 
with us, she is against us.'' A third category of critics might point out 
that India is overambitious. She wants to becane a big :power 1n a very short 
period and so she is shirking her resp(llsibilities in international pertici• 
pation to preserve the democratic way of lite as a.gain.st the totalitarian. 
Plausible as these criticisms msy sound, it should be noted that they 
are criticisns Which arise from :failure to look at the quest:l.cn tran India's 
point of view·. If the critics of India could examine her foreign policy from. 
India's point of view and not from th.et of their O'W1'l countries' 1 most of 
their criticims would tmdergo considerable modU:l.catim.. But 1t should be 
noted that SCl!le well :tnformed and wll .. placed :Individuals have always under• 
stood and ~l'Ethised with India's position. Chester Bowles, for instance, 
justifies India's foreign policy thus: 
Americans should understand India's new foreign 
policy- better than any other people because 'With its 
oratorical wrappings removed it is pre.ctically in• 
distillguishable f'rtn the foreign policy of the 
United States 'fran 1787 to 1937 •62 
61iiiae 1.;adi@ in A§H• (Minneapolis: University of Mll1nesota Press, 
1952), p. 7. 
62 Ambassador's Report, P• 235. 
He further points outs 
For 150 years we more or less faithfully tried 
to follow George We sh.ington' s tarewe 11 advice 
to avoid "permanent alliances" and to remain 
aloof from the "age-old struggle tor power in 
Europe." Like India we were very busy with our 
own affairs and inclined to place our faith in 
moral judgments rather than in positive inter• 
national action. Walter L1Pl,'1118n says that the 
preaent Indian foreign policy, like the historic 
program of neutrality and 1sola.t1on laid dawn by 
America's founding fathers, is •the natural ex•. 
pression of the vital interests of a :new state/ 63 
Sane critics hold that India is "more non-aligned towards the West 
and less towa:rds the Soviet Union." This criticism. again is not well f'O"tm.ded. 
It is true that India f'ollovs a program of planned econcny 1 like Russia. 
India approves the latter's denunciation of eolontalism. But this b7 itself' 
does not constitute a pro-Bussian attitude cm Indta'a pa.rt. India is in 
f'act more closely attached to the West. " ••••• the concrete step that Nehru 
took of retaining relationship with the Caamonwealth eV911 after India became 
a sovereign democratic republic is a step full at great import. It reinfor-
ces India's relationehip with the West and keeps her in the main stream of 
64 
the world struggle tor human treedan and social advance." 
In tine, India's foreign polic7 at non-a.U.gnment simply boils down to 
this: Refusal to sign any pact ot alliance and to receiw any military aid. 
"Atter Inde:i;andence what India needed most was peace and friendship with all 
nations so that she could devote herself' to the task of building up her 
strength. "65 
3:Q>td. 
64v. B. Kernik, "Jawaharlal Nehru: Foreign Policy" in Jr};fl NebfU: 
A Crtt3,cal pte," ed. b7 A. B. Shah, (Bcnbay: Mansktalas, 195~2nd impres-
sion 1 :g. 1 • 051l!J4., p. 94. See p. 52 infra. India abandons this principle and re-
ceives military aid from U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. to tight Red China. 
CHAPTER V 
INDIA'S REIATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS: HAS THE CREED 
OF NON •VIOLWfCE FAILEDT 
The antithesis of non-violence is violence. But Mahatma Gandhi, the 
apostle of non-violence, preached that the practise of non-violence does not 
preclude violence under certa1n circumstances. He wrote: 
I do not say 'eschew violence in yc>Ul." dealing with 
robbers or thieves or with nations that may invade 
I:ndia.' But in OZ'der that we are better able to do 
so, we ,must leam to restrain OUl."selvea; it is a 
sign not ot strength but of weakness to take up the 
pistol cm. the slightest pretext. Mutual fisticuffs 
are a training not in violence but in emasculation. 
My method of non-violence can never lead to loss of 
strength, but it alone vill make it possible, if' the 
natian wille it 1 to otter disciplined and concerted 
violence in time of danger •66 
For ~t another reason, GendhiJ1 pemitted the use of violence without 
any qualms of ccm.ecience. 
I do not believe that where there is only' a choice 
between cowardice and violence I would advise vio• 
lance. Thus when my eldest acm. asked me what he 
should have done 1 had he been present when I was 
almost fatally assaulted 1n 1908, whether he should 
have run away and seen me killed or whether he should 
have used his physical force which he could and 
wanted to use 1 and defended me, I told him that it 
was his duty to defend me even by using violence. 
I would rather have Ind1B resort to arms in order 
66r2ll!S lnd&.a• 12f?4•19g6 (New York: The Viking Press, 1927), p. 310 
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to defend her honor than tbat she should in e 
cowardl.7 manner beccme or remain a helpless 
witness to her own dishonour.67 
These were the exceptions that Gendh1J1 allowed to his do~ of non• 
violence. But the curious may ask, did GandhiJi at any time, practise vio-
lence in his own lUet He participated in the Boer War which was waged in 
South Africa tran 1899 to 19Q'G between Dutch s,ettlers and the British. Iouis 
Fischer tells that in this war, "Gan.dhlJi led his men on to the 'battlefield. 
For days they worked under the :f'1re of' 8JUm13' guns end carried moaning sold-
iers back to base hospital. The Indians sanetimes walked as much as twenty• 
fift miles a de7. "(,8 
. 
Re also participated in the First World War. In this wr be raised 
an ambulance corps of wlunteera, about eighty Indians, most of them univer• 
sit7 students in the United Kingdan. This could not be deemed an act of 
violence. But Oandb1J1 held, "those who contine themselves to attending to 
the wounded 1n battle can not be absolved trcm the guilt ot war."69 
Was Oendh1J1 1ncons1stentf How could he permit the use of violence 
while. be preached non""V'iolencef Gandh1J1 himself was aware of this question. 
p. 55. 
• • • • 1n his reply to an open letter tram Rev. B. 
de Light, he said: There is no defense tor my con-
duct (participation 1n the Britiah•Boer war, the 
Zulu rebellion, world War I) weighed anly in the 
scales ot Ahfmaa ••• But even after 1ndoctrtnat1an 
during ell these 19ars, I feel that in the circum• 
stances in which I found myselt I was bound to 
67M. K. Gandhi, N<m•Vj.oJ.ep.t Rts1&tnsre, p. 132. 
€i8 tAe LU! Qf M@at;! (i!Adhi. (Nev York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 
69 Ibid • , p. 123 • 
adopt the course I did during the Boer war 
and the Great European War and for that matter, 
the so-called Zulu 'Rebellion' of Natal in 
1906. 70 
GandhiJi 1 s inner integrity would not permit him to dodge the issue 
of the demands of Aha&!!s,a versus the demands of the stete. Explaining his 
cooperation in the wars, he wrote: 
But as long as I lived tmder a system of 
gover.nment based on f'oree and volmitarily 
partook of the 1D8llY' facilities and privileges 
it created for me 1 I was bound to help that 
government to the extent of rq ability when 
it was engaged in a war, unless I nan-cooperated 
with that government and renomieed to the utmost 
of my capacity the privileges it ottered me. 71 
Another instance where Gendh1Ji made a departure fraa the dogma of 
pure non--violence deserves mention here. "He who believed :ln the sacredness 
of !ll, life would not and did not hesitate to tnst:lgate and direct an attack 
on the monkeys in order to saw the crops." Since he could nat abstract 
himself :f'ran society and sinee agriculture was an essential human pu;r8111t 1 
"in tear and trembling, 1n humility and penance 1 I therefore participate in 
. ~ 
the inJurr 1nf'l1cted cm. tbe monkeys, hoping acme da7 to find a way out." 
Since life is governed by e multitude of forces, one Mu.at choose 
between possible alternative courses of behevior. This cho1ee must contri-
bute to the furtherance of the ult1mete value or values one holds dear. But 
OendhiJ1 claimed f'or his con.duet that "it was, in the instances cited, actua.• 
ted in the interests of non-violence. "73 
70 Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 100•101 quoting f'ran 1'h! WQ:!ld !anon:ow, New 
York, Vol. 11 No. 111 NO\lember 19281 P• 447. 
71 Ma.zumdar, MalJ!:!:al Oen.dh!, p. 101. 
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It is the purpcrt of this thesis to prove that: 
a) India's foreign polic;y of non-a.ligmnent is baaed on Gandhian creed of non• 
violence, 
b) Notw1thsta.nt11ng the fact that India used force to deal with her neighbors 
in defense of her territ~/, she did not deviate fran Gandhian principles, 
c) the Ge.ndh1an creed of non...,,iolance is b;y f'ar the best method to solve 
internat1ona.l disputes. 
Fran the foregoing pa.ssages tran Gendhiji' s writings it is clear that 
the use of violence for the defense of nationat honor was perfeetl;y just1t1ed. 
Therefore, it is im.por1;ant to review I:ndia 's conduct of her foreign relations 
with her neighbors and see how far it conformed to this Gandhian ideal 
When Tndia fought against Pak1.sten was it in defense of her national 
honorf The Kashmir issue, emong others, was the moat vital ot all which 
dr<>"n!! these two sister nations to take u.;p arms against each other. Both 
claimed Kaslmir, advancing reasons tha:t suited their convenience. Speaking 
before the Security Council the Indian Reiresentative, Sir Benegal Rau de· 
clared: 
1'he Mahara.Ja of Kashmir executed an instrument of 
accession 1n favor of India on October 26, 1947, and 
Lord Mountbatten aeeepted it 1n the next da;y. Th.is 
canpleted all legal and constitutional requirements 
tor accession to the Indian <laniniGn. Nothing more 
was required. fheretore, it is elementary that 
Kashmir now is legall;y a part ot l".ndia; that 1.ndian 
troops are legally in Kashmir going there to restore 
law and order"7~· 
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Wallbank, quoting Pakists AUa1£s. (Washington, D.c.) March 3, 1950. 
Pakistan did not accept these arguments. On the basis ot the facts or 
geography and the viShes of the people, Sir Mohammed Zafrulleh lCban said, 
Kashmir belcm.ged to Pakistan. He even pointed out that India pla19d the 
game with two different sets of l'llles, <me for Jt.m.agadh and R,,:terabad and 
the other for Kashmir. He asked 1 hov could Ind 1a d 1sm1ss all arguments or 
legal1t7 for the annexation or these two states and take her stand on the 
wishes ot the people and the tacts ot geography but in the case or Kashmir 
make legalian sacrosanct and disregard. traditions, the wishes of the people, 
and the tacts of geograph7f 
The instinct of self'•p:reservation is vital tor individuals; it is even 
more so in the case ot nations. Whatever ma7 be India's explicit reasons for 
claiming Kashmir, there is one implicit reason which should be brought to 
light: this is self-presenation. Most of the invasions ot India have taken 
place tran the north and northwest where geography provide:i convenient passage 
into the cotm.tey. For this reason, should KaahDlir tall into the hands ot 
Pakistan - an enet117 ot India - the flood ga.tes of aggression against India 
would be opened and the securit7 of India seriously Jeopardized. At one 
time Indian spokesmen may use arguments of lep.11an to protect the integrity 
ot the Union, and tor the same reason the7 ma7 reject legalim at other 
times. This does not mean that India is inconsistent. The only logic that 
appeals to India is the logic Of selt-presel"V8tion. It is this reason, more 
than anything else, that lies behind India's stand on Kashmir. Even Ross N. 
Berkes agrees with this point of view. He S&J'S 1 "Although 1t could hardly 
be argued publicfy, it is clear that Ind.tens believe that the selt•preserva-
tion of India depends in pert on holding fil'ml7 to the propasition that 
"Kashmir and JUD1Du is an integral part of India."75 But he does not see the 
validity of this view. He characterizes it as "irrational." But he does 
76 
not expl.e in how. 
Whatever others may say, e.s f'ar as India: .is concerned .Kashmir is an 
integral part of l'ndia, and it is vital for India's own self-preservation. 
When Pakistan resorted to force to take over this part of' Indian territory 
the national honor of l'lld.ia was at stake and hence India was justified, 
according to Gendhian ideology, in using force to counter the enemy attack 
on her soil. " ••• When l'ndie sent troops into Kashmir to repel the aggression 
at tribesmen ~ Pakistan. "volunteer" troops, Gandhi said the Government ot 
India had done so with his. concurrence it not with his bl.essins. ••n 
India also used its military to take over Junagadh, Hydenbad end Goa. 
Was this also in the national interests as defined by GandhiJU It so, the 
use ot force in these instances was within the 11m1ts of Gandhian ideology. 
It is important to know how and why India used force to annex Junage.dh. 
It was a very small princely state on the Kathiawar coast of India. Although 
more than eighty per cent ot its popu.lation were Hindus 1 and though Junagadh 
was entirely surrounded by the Indian Unicm. territory, in September 1947 
the Musl:lm ruler acceded to Pakistan. India strongly protested against this 
accession and pointed out that the l"Uler had acted in disregard of the tacts 
of geography stressed by Lord Mountbatten in. his speech to the Chamber ot 
75
"Ind1a-Psk1stan Relations," C'lJG'!Pt Histor:r. Ma:r 1967, P• 289. 
76iw.. 
TTMazumdar, P• 102. 
of P-rinces on the eve of Partition. India also criticized tr..e Nawab i"or 
flouting the wishes of the inhabitants of the state. The ruler maintained 
tMt what he had done was legal, but India contended that an imPortant issue 
like this could not be decided on the be sis ot legality alone 1 riots breaking 
out, and the ruler fled to Pakistan. On November 11, 1947 !.ndian troops 
entered the state and took over the administration. When a plebiscite ws 
held, the majority of the people voted 1n favor of the Indian Union. 
It is not difficult to see the anaaal.y of the situation if' India had 
allowed the ruler to retain his state or allowed his state to merge with the 
territor.r of Pakistan. It was not only incongruous with the sovereignty of 
the Indian Union, but was e.lso a potential source ot danger to the naticm.. 
Hence, when all persuasicm. failed, India used force to take over this state 
for its own selt•preservation. This action was justified on the basis of 
the plebiscite held subsequently. 
It was tor the same consideration. of self-preservation tbat India 
used force to take over H1derabad1 the most important princely state and lo• 
cated well within the center of' the Indian Union. Here aaain t.b.e Nizam was 
a muslim, supported by a a:nall minority of a muslim elite. But the vast 
majority o:f the people were Hindus. When India became independent, the 
Nizsm insisted that Hyderabad should bec001e an independent state within the 
British Camnonwealth of Nations and refused to Join the Indian Unirm. B-.it 
India was detemined to see th.at this state was merged with the Indian Union. 
Disturbances took place and Congress workers were arrested by the thousands. 
The Nizem argued that his stand was perfectly legal, stressing that once 
British paramoun:tey had bean withdrawn Hyderabad was autQ!latically an inde-
pendent sovereign state. As in the Junagadh imbroglio, the Indian Government 
- :;><::: -
disagreed with H~erabad and contended s 
The future ot political communities and states 
is not governed b7 such declarations. An issue 
like this involving the defence of India, tha 
integ:rit7 of her territory, the peace end secur• 
1t7 of the country ••• could not be allowed to be 
solved b7 mere legalistic claims ot doubtful 
validit7*78 
All negotiations between the ltizam and the Indian Government broke down 
in June 1948. 1.n order to bring the state within the Indian Union, the 
Government of India initiated en economic blockade against Hyderabad. 
Then the Nizam appealed to the United Nations to settle this dispute. 
But the Indian Government protested th.at H)'derabad had no right to do so, 
since it was not an independent state. F 1nall7, on September 13, the 
1.ndian A:ruey' took over the state • 79 
The advice that Gendhiji gave, viz, "I would rather have India resort 
to arm.a in order to defend her honor than that she should in a cowardq 
80 
manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour," was 
followed by India, both in letter and spirit 1 in the case of Goe.. The miU.-
tary acticn India took to annex Goa to the Indian Union should be seen in 
the light of this Gendhian principle before any valid criticism could be 
levelled against. 1'.herefore, it is but proper to se• whether there was any 
national honor at stake in the Goan issue that Justified India in taking 
over that foreign enclave b7 f'orce. 
78wallbenk1 p. 2411 Q,\19ltQB lf!liH Paper on HYdgabad, (Government of 
India, 1948), p. 6. 
79India maintained that it was not a m11~ invasion but Just a 
police action. 
8oaee footnote 65 supra, p. 43. 
Portugal had three :possessions 1n Banbay state, the most important of 
which wes Goa. After India became ind.ependen.t, the presence of Goa. in India 
as an integral part of' Portllg81 vas not 1n keeping with tbe sovereignty at 
India. It was regarded as a symbol at imperialism. end an irritating reminder 
or Western exploitation. In spite at repeated requests to Lisbon to open 
nagotis,tions, PortUgal had turned dow those requests, maintain:f..ng that 
aoa. be longed to Portugal and could not accede to l'.ndia under any circumsten-
ce s. Disturbances took pl.ace after a liberation movement within Goa was 
initiated. Finally, 1n Deefi!lllber 196o1 r.niU.an Arrq units took over this 
foreign pooket. Thus, the integration ot Portuguese Goa with tbe Indian 
Union was acecmplished. 'l'he beaic aim of unifying lndu was tu.\filled. 
In the case of Red China 1 the use of i'oree by India of her na:t1C11Bl 
interest was even more obviously juatifted. In this instance 1 India had to 
fight back a Chinese invasion to save her awn territory. 
The Chinese attack on India cenie as a bolt tran the blue. l'.ndia was 
shocked beyond all deseript:ton. Walter c. Neale points out that, 
Throu.gb.out their three thousand 19ars ot history 
India and China had never had a conflict. During 
the de.ya ot friendship following cam.nunist seizure 
ot powe:r, only a few Indians pointed out that the 
long history ot peace was due to the thousand 
miles of Tibet between the c01mtries. At f'irst, 
~ependent India looked upon the Chinese ccmmu• 
nist revolution as another example at a colonial 
people throw1ng ott foreign danination.1 and v!th 
aey such national movement Indians wre SJlllPllthe• 
tic. i'hen the Chinese Joined tt£e Indians in prais-
ing neutralism and noninterference 1n the affairs 
ot others. The peak ot friend ship was reached in 
1954 v!th the 3o1nt enunciation of tbe fs&h SQila., 
or Five Principles at Peace •81 
81wa.a• The SeHch tor pn~ty, Pemosmcr ana. lTome (D. van Nostrand 
Co. Inc., Princeton, Nev Jersey ~pp. 102-103. See p. 33 S'UlU'S· 
India was scrupU].ously- following these principles in its relation with China. 
But China ~as not. India f'il'mly believed 1n the slogan H1,acl1 9,llini pha& bhai 
("Ind tans and Chinase are brothers.") But China did not. This attitude of 
China came fully to light when China began to violate the 2000 mile long 
Sino-Indian :f'rontier, It was even apparent at the time of Chinese invasion 
of Tibet which was a butter state between these tvo countries and when the 
Dalai Isma, the sp:l.ritua.l. and temporal head ot Tibet and acme 13000 Tibetans 
asked tor and were given political asylum, the Chinese intentions against 
India became more and more clear. Soon after the attack, "Pmsh S!lt.2!'s 
use as the guiding force 1n India's Ch:l.ml policy is, as the J'adl!m Expr!p 
put it, "dead as the dodo," Prime m1n1ater Nehru's claim to a special neu-
. . 
tral1at magic 1n his dealings with Camaunism was now put 1n •not dead, but 
82 it was severely dama.ged." Particularly toward Bed China Nehru had followed 
see-no-evil policies, He bas also gone too tar 1n recognizing the su,perior 
pos:ttion of China, to which he had given expression on Dl8l11' occasions. He 
had admitted that Bed China was the No, l power 1n Asia, • .... he listed China 
as the world's third power • behind the u.s. and Soviet Russia •with India 
in the fourth spot 1 ahead ot Britain and France • ..S3 He deplored the exclu-
sion of Canmunist China tran the United Nations and had been much involved 
1n pleading for a seat to Red China 1n tbst bod.7. Ifehru pointed out that 
1t China was not 1n the United Rations, f'ran the point ot view of population 
and trcm the point Of view Of world !mportauce, nearly a quarter ot the 
world was not there. 
82 im., "India: End ot Panch Shila,'' December 15 1 1961, p. 31. 
8':l._ . 
-u.s, Nm yd Wo£!A Rf:J?Ort• October 291 1954, p, 81. 
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!'low Red China repaid for all this good will by stabbing India in the 
back. It violated the S1no•Ind1an border and occupiied Indian territories 
by killing the lhdian sold 1ers stationed 1n the area an the pretext that 
India was the aggressor end was expansionist. 
Hov did the S1no•Ind1,an border disP11te arisef K. M. Panikkar S&J'Bi 
fn history I India 8J!1d China have I political.17 
speald.ng, canatituted two dUferent worlds, Which, 
though touching an each other 1 bsve not influenced 
each other greatly. 1':l.e only problem which exis-
ted between them 1 Which India inherited from the 
British, related to fl.bet. India, however, recog• 
nized Chinese authority- over Tibet and the outstand• 
1ng issues between the tvo countries in this area 
were settled by negotiations in 1954 •84 
K. M. Pan:lkkar goes on to point out that the Himalayan range toms the 
natural boundary between India am Tibet. It bas never been a live boundary-1 
requiring elaborate B3."'l'1Ulgements for defence. Kxtending tran the Pamirs to 
the Burmese border, over most of the area, it is settled by long custaa 
and tradition, but at the North-Eastern end it was defined by negotiations 
between the British IruU.an authorities and Tibet. This is what 1a known 
as the MacMahan. line. Neither Red ChillS nor any other past regmes reeog• 
nized this line. Red Chtna claims that the actual frontier runs 100 miles 
south or the present line an the south slope ot the H~s. Jolm. Row• 
land puts 1t thus: 
•The genesis of the MacMahan. Line 1 tt India's Assam 
boundary 1 1s a story ot Great Britain's efforts to 
limit Chinese autharit;y 1n Tibet and to caard.t the 
Chinese to accept the R1mala,an crest • lncU.a's 
vital rampart ot defense • rather than the H:lmala)Wl 
84c9!flS!l Sense Ab9ut Nia (Hew York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), 
p. 137. 
southem base as the northeast boundary between 
India and Tibet. fhe drawing ot this line re-
presents a vital phase 1n Chinese•Indian rela• 
tiais. China's Carmnmist dynast7 tut7 years 
later would reap the benefit ot its predeees-
sor' s stubbornness and sense ot greater Chinese 
destiny in refusing to accept Brita.1.n's formula. 
1.:ndependent 1.:nd1a1 inheritor ot Britain's Indian 
Jbpire, would su...--t'er the consequences.85 
In 1959 Red China occupied 12 1000 sq. mi. ot Indian terr1t<>r7 in 
Kashmir, encl has aid el.aim to an additional 39,000 sq. mi. along India's 
northem frontier. In the summer or 19& several anied clashes occurred in 
Ladakh encl the North East Frontier Agenc-r. late in. October, Chinese Cmmu-
nist forces launched a major offensive at points all along the border. 
l1fl'hr\~ broadcast saclly to the nation, asking tor tmity in India 1 s hour ot 
peril. A national emergency was declal'eCI,. He had already dispatched an 
urgent request for military aid t1'al1 Britain end the u.s.A. ~e bGdly 
needed equipnent we.a qu1ckl.7 nown. in to the var zone. India also asked 
the Soviet T.Jnj.ai for help. The Russians helped, though :reluctantly, tor 
Russia declared that India was only a friend, but China was a brother. 
(It may be pointed. out here that ane of the main :Ingredients of India 1 s 
polic7 of non-allgmnent, to wit, nf'usal to ftceive m1l:ttaey aid, was 
abandcned1 when it asked t~ and reee1wd m111t&r7 aid tran other nation.a. 
But this wa .. s done, it should not be forgotten, in an hour ot naticmal peril. 
Further , even though there is an appann1t df'rlation. tran the creed ot pure 
nan.-v:t.olence when India resorted C»o amed res1stence against Red China, 
yet 1t was strictly within the purview of the principles of Gandh1m 
according to whieh violence 'l!la.y be used to defend one's national honor.) 
While the fig_h.ting was going on, China decla.Md a unilateral truce 
and withdrew after the 1n1tia.l successful breakthrough into Assam. What 
was Red China UP tot As the Time Magazine ohserves: 
Red Chin.8 9l'lemed spoiling for a fight - almost es 
1t determined to convict Nehru's India as pliable 
and easily- "trightened1 or else C(l'll!>el it to aban• 
don its prestigious postu:re as the greet unccmn:f.t• 
ted neutralist power :In Asa.86 
Now it is possible to turn to the crities of Indian foreign policy 
wo ask bl what way India d!tters tran the mitions of the West, when India 
has also used force to settle the disputes arising out of its international 
relations with its neighbors. How could In.die. tske over Goa by military 
action, fight egainst Pakistan end Red China and yet ma :tntatn that 1t is 
wedded to nan..,,,ola.ee and Oendhian ethics :ln solTing h1tr international 
problemsf 
It must be sdtd.tted that L"'ldia has failed to practise pure nc:u•viol• 
ence 1n ell these s1tuat1an.s, even though nan-vio'-.ance is its avowed policy. 
The Indian leaders do not believe 1n violence, much less would wish to use 
it to settle any proble!lls, dQ?ltlstte or foreign. Because t..l-ley kn.1"-T too 
well that rtolenee begets violence, and 1n the ultimate analysis, it does 
not help to settle eey problems. lheD. 1n the f'aee of Chinese 1nvasioo. ot 
India, look 1th.at Nebrtt 1'..ad said: 
We aft friendly with every country 1n the world. 
But we Will :f'ight with Chine. My desire is tCI 
avoid it but not to submit as well. If we have 
to take such a step, we will take it. But he 
added, I am tree to eontess to this House (rar11a-
ment) that my eou.1 reacts ag&inst w"ar anywil.fire. 
86ma&a: Tl:!! Dnp's BreQ8, p. 23. 
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'l'hat ia the tze.Sntng I received ~ 1ffl' 
lite, ad I c81ll10t euil.J' pt rid ot it at 1me 
age at T2. Jn 'ty.Pical }tlrueology 1 he added r 
We vUl be able to get th1a aggre••1on. w.eaWd, 
th:rougb, preaame and ~ thtql!I vt:thout sn-
ting the whole world 1nwlw4 1n w.r.87 
Bat 1t should be bOl"Dlll 1n mind that. the \t89 ot to.rce to defend 1ad1a'. 
national :lnten.t• Bad hen.or vu wrr much in. 1Rme Vith the Cendhtan ethice!3 
!be pract1c• at ncm.-rtolence VOt.lld. work on.i,. when the opponent 18 also a 
respecter ot acm.-viol.enee. ~ 1nd1a bad f'oUOWll4 non-violence to aolw her 
problem• ot f.ntegraticm and the Ch1Mae !:n:taeion it YOtll.4 baw lollt not onl3' 
1ts national hcnor but al8o tts tftedcn. Th.1• does not mean that the ideal 
ot ncm.WTiolance haa f'aile4, though it 1• JOS•1bl.e to argue that bldill may 
en occuim haw ta!W. in following it. :ror ncn.-violen:t policy to n.cceed 
the condition ~t, 't'U, the OJ1PQM!lt aJ.ao being a. beliewr in non• 
dol.Atnce 1 should exist. otherv1se it ma7 be necessary to resort to viol.Amee 
en oceaston.. ~ wu the ad"f'iee Mal:Jatae. 8llft the nation to &trend itaelt 
1n its ham" ot danger. Thia w.s Oandh1en wildcn. was be a down-to-earth 
pregmtist or wa he Just a ~~· Yia1maryf 1'118 enawer t;o thia 
queat1c:n f.s tar poetert~ to gtw. Aa a scientist, Mahatma. Oan4h1 bad 
postulated cenam theories tat' aocial exper1Mnt. He ewa demonstn.tted to 
au the world the succe88 at hi• u.pertment using :tt agatnst the then might• 
1est British~. U it could vorlt 1n the eaae ot one nation, tt may be 
presumed, 1t coul.d work in the case ot other nations as wll, l'l"O'f'1ded. all 
the ~ cond1t1ms exist. lfo dou.bt, the cre~ic:n at such ta"f'01'9ble 
-'~ -
ccn41t1ons is d.1ttieult, 1t not 1llpose1ble. !he n<m""Vlolent wq 11 w.atl.J' 
llQ1'eri.or to ezxy otihor means ot sol Ting PtOblems, domestic or fo:Nlgn, nation.• 
al or f.nternat1cmal, siml>le or cmpltoated. H'UID8nit7 will be rlcher, CllllD.dh1J1 
t!ml.7 beliewd.1 tor uaing it to erndlcate ... ~ml mazd.fold 1lla that 
plague the W01'l4 todq. Bene•, the acm-rtolent :I.deal 1• 'WOl:'th nrtv1ng 
for. As tbe Bev. 'I. a._.,. poin.1-a Old : 
••• tt ia a cle;l.udcn to 4181'W&Ud p.ropl'»ta \tiecauae 
the7 are not able to gift pzecf.M Pftdict:lans 
abottt the tu:Wn. llv-. a ;polltic..U.,- eGIQeten1; 
prophet like GeadhSJ1, ~ coul4 !n.Ucate ob• 
ject:bea, ._. not ala w tul.11' reach tba. 
'What tOl'IU can nao.-vtolence take 1 and to what 
exaent can it au.cceedt hactiatng it ill the 
cm~ vq ot diacowri.Dg what it ca achieft. • S9 
ClrAP'l'mt VI 
INDIA AND nm m.nm 'WQIW) 
WA'? m r.rs JMPC81MCB m mE WOlW) SrroATJDN 1'0D\Y! 
What ts the third vorldf To 1mav the third world, it is 1mpo.rtant 
to know the other tvo worlds :pzecedt.ng the th!J:rd. Mario Roaai describes 
it thwn 
The third world caaprtaea the dewlOJ>ing natims 
ot Asia and. Afftca. It took a place, after World 
var II, aloagalde the Weatem World and the Canu• 
Dist War!"ld. It 18 "'l'hird" not m17 beoaue the 
other two pncec1ed 1t, btnatma the scene ot hi•-
to.l."11 but also t.n. ao f8I" u it poaaeuea a perama.l• 
it7 ot lta own, JU8t as the ot;bera do. It la not 
a world vaS:Una to choose vh1ch a1tle to 3om. becauae 
it bas alnad7 choaln to be itaelf'. Its 'ri.sicn ot 
the tutun, :I.ta med.a, tta perapecttwa an 4U'f'er• 
ent 1 end theae .,. all 1zlc<lll;Pa't1ble With the idea 
that the vorld can be et.tiler ~1c fA the 
Weatem aenae or Socialtn 1n the Soriet or Chine• 
..... 1'o t.ba old altematiwa it baa e4de4 cme ot 
lta ow.990 
It must be noted that I.attn America ctoea not bel.t.mg to this 1'ldzd World. It 
ecanaU.c unde~ftloJ;lllent was the an.q cl"f.tertan., Latin America wculd fall 
into thla csbeP7• Dllt 1t does not abaft VS.th Ada end Africa a maber of 
traits which malre ot them a world a119rt. Its tra41tlana1 l.ansuaae, and re• 
1181cm belcmg to the Weat. It nma!ns a. autfXlfllOWS entlt7 within the 
Westem cCllllNU1t7 ot natlc:ma. 
- &A -
The Second World War set several revolutions in motion. It shook 
long established traditions, ways of lite, and approaches to world Pl'Oblems; 
it produced social pb.enanena and traneformat1cm.s. When caapared to our 
revolutim all the other revoluticns which preceded it shade into 1ns1gn.Ui-
eance. J'or instance 1 the agricultural revolutic:m changed man into a delib• 
erate cultivator ot his own tood supply. No doubt the Industrial Revolution 
hadbrougb.t abOl1t tar more cb.anses in e. few decades than Europe had known 
during the p.recedtng two thou.san4 years. But the Revolution of our time is 
bound to prove ewm llK'XN tar-reaching in its consequences. The peaceful 
appllcat1cm.s of nuclear and other f'orms of energy, the desalting of ocean 
water that lltlJ' make deserts bloaa, the popUl.a.tian explosion( which af'f'ects 
certain ccm.thents more than others) 1 the new explorat:lcm.s and discoveries 
1n outer space that will add a coade dimension to man's lite • all this 
and much more will attect radically our '9'1ev of the world and our relatian• 
ship to it. 
Hov is the present revoluti<Jl more remarkable than the previous 
revoluticm.st The speed ot catmun1cations bas erased distances; the emergence 
of the i'h1rd World baa caused every ccm.ttnent to becaae a participant in the 
process of histoey-; nuclear energy has endowed certain nations with the 
capacit7 to destroy not mi,. this or that cit7 or reg1an but the whole hUlll&n 
race; technology has produced an UJlPlZ'8.].leled equalization v1th1n and amcmg 
countries; tor the first time an organizattan, the l.hited Baticm.s represents 
most ot the world. Above all, this revoluticm. is \mique in 'that 1t torces 
a universal a~h·-howner reluctant--to human problems. 
- ...... -
Another important characteristic ot the present revolution is that 
is has introduced iaeolog.y as a da:a1nant factor 1n international relations. 
The idea that a c01.m.try uses ideologies 1n tbe pursuit ot its foreign atf'a.1rs1 
or em.ploys 1ts pawr to prcnote an ideoloa, is ccaparativeq new. !l'hia 
could be seen 1n the emergence of the United states and the Soviet Unim to 
world pranin.ence after the Second World war. !his is an Age of Ideology. 
bre is a cmstant rivaley' going on between the ideoloO' ot Western demo-
cracy and the Cammmist ideology winning the allegiance of individuals and 
nations. The so-called 'cold war' or the international tensions ot to-day 
is the consequence of this conflict betw9en the ideologies. The behavior of 
the '1'h1rd World in su.ch a coo.text is very important. 
How did the !hird World cane S.n.to existencet 'Dle countries ot the 
Third World, except Algeria and Vietnam, have not lmown the protracted bloody' 
struggles, tbe battles and nvoluticm.s, that many of the nations ot Eu.rope 
bad to tight in order to secure their independence. They became tree tr1• 
marU7 because they were caught and carried alcmg 1n the whtrlv.tnd of the 
revolution ot our time. But there was also certain degree ot inevitability 
ot independence to these coun:trs.es due to the tact that the administering 
cotmtries carried with them the e1vil1zat1an that was the product of their 
own industrial revoluticm.. A good ~ ot the nationalist leaders ot the 
Third World, like Gandhi, Nehru., Soekamo, and lflmrmah, had studied :In 
Europe ar the United states a.nd had absorbed Western c1vil1zat1an and 
the principles ot demoerac7 and egalltariania1. To t1gh.t the West they adop• 
ted the principles and the methods ot the West. The adoption by Asian and 
Atrican :Intellectuals of pr1nc1ples 8l'J!'tog1ng trca laropean trad1t1ons 
caused an enti•!bropean :reacticm. for which BQrope was 1nd1rectl.Y' :responsible. 
'l.'he revolution of our time, having orig1nated in Europe, could not but engulf' 
the c0tmtrie s dadnated by Europe. 
The sbitt in the bal.ance of power caused by World War II was largely 
responsible for accelerating the emergence ot the ~world comitries as 
independent nations. No doubt, the procesa by which Europe tmderm:t.ned its 
own. colonial power thrOlJ8b, the spread of its institutions vas going on slow• 
iy but stea.t:11:cy- even befOft' the outbreak of the Second World war. But this 
process alone, it would have talcml many more generations tor the !11.ird World 
countries to gain their independence traa their masters. In the Second 
World war, Germany defeated France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Br1tam 
was saved by the intervention of the United states end the Soviet l1nion. 
!l'hese two countries emerged as the daninant factor in international politics, 
and both wre tre.d1tianally ant:t-colan1allet. This bad its own :lm.pact on 
the end of' the era ot colon.1aliaD.. Further, wartime pranisea and de cl.era• 
tions such as the Atlantic Charter and the Foar Freedau bad also greatq 
helped LJ. creating a eon.du.c1w climate for the birth ot the Third World. 
ID.tense national.ism and insatiable desire to catch up as speedily 
as possible With the more progressed peoples ot the West activated the 
countries of the Third World beyond descrtption. A semi-colonial Chine 
emerged :f'ran the war as one ot the Big Five. '!'he Philip_pines, hitherto a 
eolcmy of the United states, was granted independence cm. July 4, 1946. 
T.ndia had been ruled over by Great Britain tar more than a century and a 
halt. During 'the Second World war, India bad :pert;icipated 1n tr.i.e allied 
war effort. It p~d an imPortant - perhaps dec1si:n •• role 1n Africa 
and the Middle Bast, especially after Japan had occupied Burma and 1.nd1a's 
own security was in danger. Finally, <1.1. AugllSt 15, 19'~6, Great Britain 
relinquished its Indian empire and created two independent states, India 
and Pald.sta.n. After the war, Ceylon, Duma end Nepal also became independent 
eou:ntries. 1'ms most of Asia became tree. 
The story ot the process by- which African countries WOil independence 
is even more striking. With the exception of Algeria, Africans did not have 
to fight for their t'reedan. Freed.cm came to them because it ws inevitable. 
'l'he global revolution had spread to Africa also. The European powers aban.• 
dmed an.e territory attar another, not because they lacked the strength to 
hold them, but because the7 re<:ognized the relentlessness ot the revolution• 
ary process. 1'b.1s is how Asia and Africa became tree after the Second World 
war. i'his, 1n. brief 1 is the story ot the genesis of the Third World which 
did not exist as a separate entity beto:re the Seean.d World var. 
In today's world situation, the ~ird World p~ an tmportant pert. 
Ifo doubt there is a wide gap between the nations of the other two worlds and 
those ot the Third World 1n marq nspects. Nevertheless, 1n the context of 
the modern world caught in tlhe throes ot rising international. tensions 
threatening to precipitate a third world war, the Third V<rld does play a 
vital role. Rossi points out: 
t'he gap 1n historical eTOlutic:m and internal 
structures between the Third World and the other 
tvo worlds is perhaps the most a:tgu1ticant ele• 
ment that the rise ot Asia and Africa to tree• 
dom baa added to the pe.ttem of inter-state re-
latic:ms. 'l'he i'hird World baa introduced diftr• 
s1ty- - diftrsity- not mlJ" within itself but also 
1n respect to the Western and the Carmunist eou:n-
trtes. This new element gifts the !rhird World its 
independent existence, and the tact that it has 
cme mu.st be taken into account. For continents 
with different structures, to aecanodate this 
new real1t1' ia a difficult task, rendered e'ftn 
more d1tt1eu.lt h1' the pp 1n social and econanic 
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conditians that tend to drive the developed 
and the deftloping nations further apert.91 
Perhaps the countries of the !hird World are underdeveloped. ~ 
till recently the;y were anly cola:des Of the Western :powers. But still they 
merit attentian for their potential tor m.ald.ng a valuable contribution to 
the call\le ot world peace. Ai'te:r the Second World var the United states and 
the Soviet Union emerged as two super powers • not as friends as they were 
during the war 1 but as rivals locked in an eternal contl.1ct of ideologies. 
'.fbe;y have deep mutual f"ears and susP1c1ans. 1'he Americans accuse the Russians 
of "aggressiw cammm.isra," and the Russians accuae the Americans at 
. . 
"capitalist 1m,Ptr1aliam." George r. Kennan makas a lucid analysia ot the 
causes that lie beh1nd the tensions betwen these two catmtries. He sees 
in the present military strength ot Russ1a an 1Daed1ate threat to the secur• 
it;y of central and veatern Europe. '!b.181 be attributes to the tact that the 
Soviets have c<ne into control ot 'the pb\raical and technical and mm.power 
reBOUJ'C9s of the Baltic states, ot eastern 0eJ.'!IUID1", and ot the satellite 
c0W1tr:lea ot eaatem Burops. limnan poSnta out another cause for the Soviet • 
American trictian. as f'ollows: 
The next tact we must note is the congenital 
and deep.seated hostil1t7 ot the Soviet regime 
to the older and le.rger countries ot the wes-
tern world, and paz1;icularl7 ot the United 
states. '!here has been much argument as to what 
caused this hostil1t7: whether it was a pzoeconcep• 
ticm. ot the canunist m0'81l!Am.t or whether it was 
saaething provoked bJ' wnern policies toward 
the Soviet regime in 'the 19ars ot its 1Dtaney. 
Ac~, both factors enter in, but the more 
1mpcrtant ot the two baa been b)t' tar the ideol• 
ogical p:reJudice entertained 'b1' the Soviet 
91 ~·1 P• 29. 
leaders long before they- seized power in 
Petrograd in 1917.92 
Ac1..·~c.:-Oing to Kemum, the Soviet leaders were always on the lookout 
for an e~,;ternal enemy to explain and justify their own excesses and cruelties 
when they- were taced with the respan.s1bll1ties of power. In the thirties 
the7 actually had two such genuine enemies - the Germans and tib.e Japanese. 
World War II bad eliminated these real enemies. Thereafter the Russians 
looked tor a f1ctiti0\1S enemy, and found one 1n the United states. Kennan 
stqlSI 
We had eveey qualificatian for being cast in 
au.ch a role. BJ" our 1n.s1stence an rema1ning 
in Gem.q- and. Au.stria and controlling Japan, 
b7 stU'fen:l.ng BQ:rope with Marahall nan aid, 
and b7 defending the political integrity of 
South ICorea 1 we prevented that canpl.ete sweep 
of dan:lnant Soviet 1nf'lwmce over lb.'o:pe and 
Asia which was staUn 1 s initial postwar hOJ;>e. 
BJ" keeping treedan alive in the inmediate prox• 
imit7 of 8ov1et-occuPied enas, we ccaplicated 
the consolidation of camm.m.ist control there 
and maintained, in effect 1 a constant threat to 
the securit7 of Sort.et power ••• 3or all these 
reasons we must recognize Soviet hostilit7 as 
scnething reflecting a deep historical and 
political log1c.9S 
Red China now causes a greater headache to the Vest than the Russians. 
Bven J. William Fulbright 1 the Cha1l'man of the U. s. Senate :Foreign Relations 
Camo.ittee bas given expression to this. lie writes: 
There is an UD&Cknowledged presence in all 
that w think and sa7 and do in cannect:t.an. 
with Vietnam: the presence of China. We wage 
92aeaM$kl@ °'t;;*l5{f,'~ PoUsrz (P:r:tnceton, New Jersey 1 
Princeton Uniwrsit7 ss, 1 ;.:69. 
93~. 1 PP• ~-6<) • 
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var against the Vietcong and North Vietnam 
but we regard them as instruments of China, 
and it is China and Chinese Communism that 
we regard as the real threat to the securit7 
ot Sou.tl"•ast Asi.a.94 
Is there a real Chinese threat to world peace! Or ls it only 1mag1n-
ary1 In the opinion of Fulbr:tgb.t there is no real Chinese threat. Mo.st of 
the tea:r ot Red China stems tran the doctri.lle enunciated in September 1965 
b7 the Chinese Minister ot Defense, L1n Piao. He divided the world into 
two parts, the "cities" end "rural areas." The fOl"lller includes the Un.ited 
, ' , 
states, We stem Europe 1 and tha Soviet Union. 1'he latter includes Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. '.fhe rural areas w:Ul surround and conquer the 
cities in the same way the Chinese Caaun1sts starting f'rm tbe countryside 
gradually took over all ot continental China. It is this statement ot lin 
Piao that has disturbed end scazed the United States. The Urdted states 
tbiDks that China is as aggressive as Oel'lll&q ws in the th11't1es. But 
Fulbright thinks it is not true. It does not exist as a fact. At best it 
is <mly a doctrine. He points out that acne distinction must be made between 
What China's leaders say and what the;y do. He gives figures to prove his 
point. In Vietnam itself 1 Fulbright says, the United states bad sane three 
hundred thousand troops as of m.1d•l966 'While the Chinese had onl.Y' a tew 
thou.sand men 1n work tea.ms assisting tJ:ie Horth Vietnamese. Furthermore 1 he 
asserts China is real.ly tolerant and not aggressive. It bas allowed end 
respected the independence of its neighbors Ulm Burma, Worth Vietnam and 
Borth Korea. Even G-.orge Kennan e.grees with the viev that Red Chine eould 
94~ Anogaace of Pm£ (Nev Yorks Randcn House, l966), p. 139. 
not be a t11.l"eat for the reason that it lacks military•industrial strength 
and is d:lst1nctl.7 a resou.rces•poor countey.95 
Whether the mutual threats are real or not, the power blocs are 
act big and reacting canstsntly, ea.ch hoping to beat the other :in various 
ways. Even. before World War II tbe riva.lry between the two blocs to widen 
the area of the 1r influence was going an at a slow pace. But after the war 1 
the canpetit1cm. and rivalry increased b7 aaps and bomids resulting in a 
tension th.at threatens the ou.tbreuk at a 1'hird World war :lnvolv!ng weapons 
that could axinihilate the hl.Jmali race t'ran the face Of the earth. Frederick 
ll. Hartman describes this ri.:,l.ralry • the so-called cold war • 1n these terms: 
Even without ideological diseensians, trouble 
between the victors would not haw been abnormal; 
with it the Cold war became a tense Gruggle 
between Ba.st and West, waa,ed on a maber of 
levels • econanic, psychological, political • 
and over a number ot basicall.7 distinct issues 
whose exact outlines were 'frequentl.7 blurred 1n 
the ideological excbange-96 
He pinpoints four main issues involved 1n tllis Cold War. They are, f'1rst, 
the enormous growth 1n :power of' Russia and the increasing :Influence Of can-
munim 1n the poat-lilorld•W&r•II world. 'l'h1a issue includes a number Of 
questions raised by the Russian establishment ot p.re·l~ boundaries and 
position in Asia and its pre•l9V. boundaries 1n lurope. Seelllld, the 
95:Jror a detailed ana.lysis of this fact refer to the chapter on 
"h hoblem of Soviet Power," in Kennan's book, Realities ot American 
Foreign l'ollcy 1 especiall$ pp. 63-67. No doubt, the ftlergence of China as 
a nuclear power calls for a mod1t'icatian ot Kannan' s vievs toda7. 
96J:e Bela:t(&gp.s o{ lati511! (?lew York: The Macmillan Canpa.JQ', Sec. 
Fn. 1 19Ei2~ p. 502. For a detailed treatment of the subject of Cold War, 
refer to D. F. Fleming, ~ £:9ld Wv !nd Ip Srkia! (Oarden City, Mew York: 
Doubleday & Co. 1 Inc., 19 J. 
extension of cc:mmunist f'orm of' government to CbinB and the events that llow 
trau it; third, the Russian dauinS.tion ot the Balkans and Poland, end fourth, 
dauinant Russian ini'luence 1n Eastern Germ.any. Stnce these issues individu• 
ally end collectively constituted a threat to the Western security, they 
gave rise to problems ot policy f'ormul.at1<m end imPlementation by the West. 
'l'o understand the grave situation ot the world today 1t is necessary 
to know what makes it so grave and dangerous end who is responsible for it. 
Because of conflict of ideologies end the mutual threat to each other's 
security, the power blocs have resorted to various measuzoes to protect 
themselves and to undemine the relative strength of the opposite side. 
r.n other WOl'ds, they encted militaz7 alliances and engaged themselves 
fever1~ 1n ams race. These mil1'fia.x7 alliances split the world into rival 
camps (excluding the 1'l1rd World countries) end made it bipolar. 
In Asia, however, the balance of power atter World War n was unsta-
ble. Attar tbe collapse of the Chinese Nationalist pawer in 1~9 a turther 
elaboration of alignment qstem took place. In 1951-521 the United states 
concluded a aeries of treaties with Japan, the Philipines, Australia and New 
Zeal.elld. Atter preventing Red China and North Korea trait making further 
inroads 1nfx> South Korea, the United states concluded a tnaty' with South 
Korea against an armed attack 1n the Pacific area against either of the 
parties. A treaty ot alliance was also concluded between the United states 
end Nationalist China by which Formosa end the Pescadores were guaranteed 
against mainland attack. By the formation ot the SBA.'l'O (South last Asia 
'l'reat7 Organization) 1n 1954 with Awstralla, France, Nev Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philiptnea, !.b.a1.l.and1 the United states end the United Kingdm, the 
balance of power attained a preca:r1ous stability 1n Asia. 
·-
The Baghdad Pact came into being 1n 1955 in tbe Middle East. Iraq 
withdrew fran this Pact after a revolution. '!hereafter it was renamed as 
C:Bfi'l'O (Central '!reaty Organizatian) with Britain, 1'urke7, Pakistan, end Iran 
as members. 
'1'he canpetition betwffn the :power blocs to widen the area ot their 
influence in the world and to match the might ot each other has not produced 
any beneficial results to mankind except to worsen international tensions. 
Tb.a ams race represents a dog-eat-dog ca.apet1t1an in the f'ield ot manufac-
turing and stock•p111ng more and more deadly and destructive weapons e.ll in 
the name of' selt-detense. A chronological survey ot the denlopnent ·or 
weapons over the ages, atrict.11' speakir~, is outside the scope ot this work, 
even thOUgb. it might be hel.ptul to understand the magnitude ot power of des-
gr 
tru.cticm that mank1nd has achieved. Dr. David R. I:ogl:ls, a senior t>h1'sicist 
at the Argonne National IAborator;r, Illinois who participated 1n the produc• 
tion of the first atc.u.1c ba.ab writes as follows about the unprecedented de• 
stru.ctive nature ot tbe nuclear weapons: 
Our concepts ot civilisaticn, of political 
instituticns, of reU.g:to.n. and moralit7, and 
of WU' have all grown up together, gradually, 
throughO\lt histor:r and before. Swldenl.1 in 
the middle t'nntieth cent\12!'7, one ot them, 
the concept ot war, hU l'&dically changed. 
?luclear sources of devastating energy, the 
A-baab and the H-bamb1 have su.ddan.q multi• 
plied by a ndllion the power ot the weapcns 
which can be used by man. !he word "war" 
to Which w have become accustcned 1n the 
past 1 is no langer adequate to describe 
97 A brief' but exhaustive surve7 of weapons develoinent ls given by 
Hartman, pp. 169•175 1n Chapter 8. 
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what we can expect, but we have no better 
word. We cen call it "nuclear war,• and 
we must learn to feel bow Wr'J' different 
nuclear war is likely to be tran the vars 
with chemical explosives which mankind has 
sun1.ved 1n the past •90 
Dr. Inglis describes the power of ans bmb thus: 
For Bn7QD.8 Who has read aaae deacription ot 
the devastation which took place 1n Rotter• 
dam or Hamburg or Lcmdcm. or Cologne or 
Coventr)' or Tokyo or ~ of the dozens ot 
cities Vhlch suf'tered enorm011s and tragic 
and :l:rreparable losses trcm chemical ex• 
plosiws 1n World war II, perhaps the 
best wa7 to V7 to :Imagine the power ot <me 
big H-bcnb is to thinlt ot all this destl'\1.C• 
t1ve power dumped an one cit7 in the tlaah 
ot cne s1ngle explosion. !hat is just part 
ot What one H•ballb can de.. One single 
twenty'-megaton H-banb delivers more explo• 
siw power than that of all the weapons 
used bJ' all naticm.s tor all purposes during 
all the 19ars of World War II, or tor that 
matter, during all the wars ot history •99 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now in possession of 
H-banba whose deatl'\1.Ct:lve megatcm. capacit7 is JllBD.1' times twenty. As early 
as 1963 Premier Khrushchev annot.m.ced that Russia bad developed a hundi'ed 
megatcm. bmb. ~ believed then • many beliew now • that that marked e. 
tuming point 1n the Cold war between the power blocks. A nuclear deadlock 
was created. But the auper powers continue through research and develop:.lent 
to look tor possible technological breakthroughs even though both have caae 
to acknowledge the existence ot a balsnce of terror. Out at this horrible 
situation, a strange theory was developed according to Which ,;ne i;;wo pu_..1. 
blocs, -1nth almost equal nuclear veaPQlB could be relied u;pan to retrain 
from attacking each other for fear of nrta.l1at1an. The idea of a utopia of 
permanent peace was developed ou.t of a situation of utmost peril. Churchill, 
at that time, believed it Possible that •we would by a process of sublime 
irony have reached a st• 1n this story where safety vill be the sturdy 
child of terror, and SUJ"rlval the twin. brother of amdhilatian."100 
In a vorld can.text, such as this, the Third World countries do play an 
important role Which serves the cause of world peace. HO'lrlf '.ftle emm.tries of 
the Third World are wedded to the policy of ncma.Ugnment 1n the deadly power 
struggle of the blocs. This again calls tor a definition of 1nell.aligament.' 
To quote J. w. Burton, Senior lecturer 1n Internaticmal Relations, tm.1wr-
sity College, Londan: 
Tbs tem 1ncm.alignment1 as camn~ used to 
describe the foreign policies of nations which 
are not 1n an alUance with either the Cammm:lst 
or the Western bloc, despite the feeling at the 
political leaders of the nanaligned nations 
that it does not convey satisfactorily' a descrip• 
tian of their policies. 11cmal.iamaent has no 
positive value Which they wish most to express. 
In Belgrd.de, Cairo, Delhi, and other centres of 
nanaligmnent, other and ewn less satisfactory 
terms are frequently used: 'nan•bloc,' 'uncamuit• 
ted, 1 1act1wly neutral,' are sane of those. 
lDng phrases and speeches are scnet:tm.es the only 
means of Oftrccmf.ng frustrations eX:Perienced as 
a result of the absence of 8l'q term which is as 
,et su:ttieientl.7 mean1ngtul.. For vant ot a 
better term 'ncmaligoment' has now been adopted 
wry pneral.ly •••• 
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What is the content of nonali~~mtY How to define a nonaligned eounteyi 
The re.:..Jresento.tives of twenty governments claiming to pursue nan.alignment 
met at Cairo· in June 1961 1n a Preparatory Meeting for the Belgrade Conference 
and attempted to def'1ne a ncm.aU.gned countJ."7. The Ccm.f'erence adopted five 
broad criteria to distinguish a ncmaligned eountJ."7. A nCllaligned cotmtey 
should 
(1) Follow an independent policy based on nonal.1gmnent and peaceful coex1s-
tence1 
(2) Support liberation movements; 
{3) ~lot be a member of a multilateral. military pect in the context of the 
East-we at struggle; 
( 4) Not be e 1Ae111ber of a bilateral mU1tary pact With a Big Power in the 
last-West struggle; 
(5) Not grant military bases to foreign powers. 
Fran the foregoing definition of a n<l.Ull.igned country it is clear what 
the nonaligned c01mtries of the 'l'h:lrd World stand for. At this point it is 
necessary to distinguish between n<malignmant and neutrality. N. Parames-
waren NS18J."1 a lecturer 1n Politics at the U'niwrsity of Kerala in fri._:__, 
India, points out that the nonaligned countries had !B8de a definite end 
clear distinction. between the two tems. He says: "Though these countries 
spoke of non.alignment, it vas made clear as early as 1947 that it bad 
nothing to do with neutrality, passivity or anything else." India was nan.-
eliglled but not neutral; Indonesian policy was •mae:pendent and active;" 
Egypt sought to pursue "positive neutrality... There have been repeeted 
expressions or this dist:i.nctian between ncmaligm.ent and neutrality O'ftr 
all these ,ears by the leaders af these nations •••• On quest1cns of 
coloniali.sm, recialism, and peace th.are has not been any tendenc7 for neu• 
tralit:r among tl1ese nations."102 
Charles G. Fenwick not only discusses the concept of neutralism but 
also points out tr..e part played by the nonaligned countries in the cause af 
world peace through collectiw security. 
Mot a little can.tu.s1an has been created by the 
use ot the tem •neutra.lian" to describe the 
pasition of states "W'hich, while still loyal 
to the United Nations, are holding aloof frail 
the political controversies and conflicting 
policies ot the "cold war" between the United 
states end the Soviet Union. !hey are su.pport ... 
1Dg the basic pz1,nc1ples of collective secur-
ity, but they realize that in certain situations 
they misht be r1sldng their very existence 1n 
taking s1<k!s against a state in possession of 
the atomic bcnb. But 1n thus standing aloof 
fr.:m participation 1n Possible military' action 
1n su,ppon ot a decision ot the Security COtm.Cil 
they are atiU ready to affirm the principles 
ot the Che:rter.103 
The 1hil'd World gives to What serves the cause ot peace a ditterent 
interpretation fran that genera~ advanced by the industrialized countries. 
'l'here wa.s a t1ma \1hen people 1n the West beliewd that peace could be se• 
cured onl;v through the defeat at camau.nim, while the CCIJl"iluniats preached 
the caning of the millennium following the violent elimination ot capitalism. 
~ay it is asllUl'led the.t because at! the nuclear menace Western democracy 
and Soviet cammm.ism will have to coexist, but not necessarily peacetu~. 
Each side entrusts the preservation. of its territory and wa.7 of lite to 
the balance of power, vievcd as the ooly guarantee ot peace. ar rather ot 
non..inr. This theory implies that only the eo.mtrles capable of •ste.bl1ah:l.Ttg ______________________________ ,__ __________________________ __ 
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"Tb.e Rise of the Third World,• in Wcnold = :. ~~s nn I .... _._ _-t..-n 
PoJ4t1cs,.ed. by Walter c. Clemens Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965) 
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the balance are pr1marily respansible tor keeping the peace. 'l'he 1'hird 
World does not den;r this p.remise 1n present 1nternational conditions. It 
does de:n.1'1 however, that t.'lere is no alternative to the balance of :power. 
The alternative as the 1'h.1rd World sees it, is a world disaxmed, working 
troward objectives beneficial to the whole human race. 
It is now understood 1n sane quarters that the real, though indirect, 
threat to the world peace lies 1n the disparity between the industrialized 
and the proletarian countries. 
Each J98r the rich countries distribute about 
eight bilU.on dol.l.ars to thole which are poor. 
1'he military bu4gets Of these countries total 
140 billion dollars. !he relattansh1p between 
the• two f'igu:res is 1n itself the heaviest 
possible eondemDatian Of the policy Of the 
great powers. It is seneraJ.17 agreed that the 
1ndustrl.alized countries shot114 contribute one 
per cent ot their gross natianal product. We 
an tar tl'm reaching this goal. And France, 
which is malting the greatest effort of all, 
each ,.ear :reduces the percentage Of its ccntri-
bu.tion. All the other countries are also de· 
c:reaaing their aid 1 either :In absolute tems 
or as a percentage of their total Oil'. T.b.is 
trend is a.laming: it abOW8 the dangerous lack 
of ccmcer.n. tor the th1rd world amcmg the great 
powers.1oa.. 
lconmic assiatance, the !'bird World feels, 1s not <m.17 a partial resti• 
tution of the riches the Westen countries 'took tram their colcnies -
sanetb.ing to which the new countries believe they are f'ull7 entitled - but 
is also a benefit to the sivers. Within sane nations the indifference of 
the wealthJ' classes to the poverty ot the majority has led to revolution 
and violent chmlSe. On a s1m1lar basis, the wealthy comitrles cannot feel 
].()la. 
Josue De Castro and Maurice Owmier, Manitesto For tbe !bird World, 
2M• 9JJn!nts, Wmter, 1968, pp. l-2. 
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secure amid intolerable :poverty. Money spent cm wr preperaticns is consid-
ered not an:cy- an investment in mass annihilation, hence a folly, but also 
en injustice because it could mean the salvatioo or hundreds of millions of 
people. 
Miss Barbara Ward makes her following observatim: 
Another reason tor our relative indit'terence is 
that owing to the relative nnder•populaticm. ot 
our pert of the world and owing to the scale of 
latent resources vatting to be dewloped 1n the 
Atlantic world, we in the West bad not too much 
(sic) dit'ticult a passage to modemit;y; certain• 
11 nothing CQl1P8Z'ed with the really appalling 
d1lAJmDes that are taced b;y the under-developed 
world todq. So, al'though w are perhaps begin• 
n1ng to see that they face almost insumountable 
problems, I do not think we have worked out our 
response or even perhaps ~ measured our re-
spana1bU1t;y. Yet there is no hunum ta1lure 
greater than to launch a profoundly important 
endeavour and then leave it ba.li' done. This 
is what the West bas done vith its colcnial 
system. It shook all the societies 1n the YOl"ld 
loose f'ran their old moorings. But it seems 
1nditterent whether or not they reach sate harbour 
in the end.105 
strangely enough, the West • part1cularly the United states - does 
not telte kindly to the demands ot the !h:l.:rd World cO\mtrtes, eftn though 
it extends ecanaaic aid to these countries, one presumes without 8rf3' strings 
attached. Report:lllg fran Belgz'S.de, time •We km.don Bu:reau Chief 1 Robert 
Elson, te.kas a look at "n.ana.11.gnment• as follows& 
At tbe Belgrade Conference of ncm.aligned CO\m• 
tries acme W't'Y oddl.7 assorted naticma produced 
sane strange Ju.de)uents which have disturb:lllg 
:lmplicatiaus tor the Vest. :l9en though the 
Ccmterence was punctuated b7 the m:tnous obli• 
gatto ot Soviet nuclear ex»loaions, it produced 
no formal condemna.tio.n ot Nikita IChrllschev' s 
v1olaticm of the world's can.science or e'ftll a 
pr.oof ·1o6 
What i :.:itated Y.r. Els~ -w-aa, 
••• the most ambitious demand ••• that the non-
aligned c01.mtries shou.ld not anl.y be represen-
ted et tutu.re di88l.'!?l8m.ellt conferences but that 
thf1 should actually be included 1n the 1nspec-
t!on and control system. Here 1 putti:D8 forth 
1ts cl.em to be recognized as equal with the 
great powers, the Ccmference showed an arrogant 
assi.J'.!ll.)tio.n of moral superiority vhich the can• 
f'erees attach to 'nanal:tgnment• itself •1J( 
But there are others, it is gratUJing to note, Who take a different 
and. more realistic attitude towards the 1'h.1rd World countries. Here is the 
obaenatiao. ot another expert • Frederick 1tuh - who covered the Belgrade 
Conference ot Neutrals for the Chicago &:m-T:lmes: 
Tbs United states and Soviet Un1an would throW 
themselves tor a calamitioua loss if either fails 
to take the nonaligned group into account 1 ewn 
though on balance the Ccnf erence was more favorable 
to the S1no-sorl.et bloc than to the American•led 
camp. After all, the nonal.1gned represell'ted <me 
fourth of the earth's inhabitants and a quarter ot 
the total U.N. membership. Ahd, despite its ugli• 
ness1 the eon:f'liet over Berlin is a minor epiaode, 
while the struggle between the two blocs for the 
allegiance of the uncamnittAd world is a pivotal 
and long-tem manite station of our Age •id3 
He further :points out that tbe uncamnitted world is growing and is exerting 
magnetism, and " ••• even if tod.ay' it is merely a glint: the birth of a 
' 109 !h1rd Force ••• does create a cushion between the two giants." J'obn B. 
106aobert Bl.son, "Don't Expect Much frc:n Nonaligned" Life, Sept. 15 1 
1961, P• 54. 
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i~"Power ot the Nonaligned", TAI Ngtcp, Sept. 23, 1961, p. 172. 
~· p. 174. For a list or the nonaligned countries, see Table 1. 
()eke& tolerates the J'JOD8.ligment policy ot the 'l'hird World c0tmtries thue: 
'liie perfectly clear refwlal al the nev countries to 
side autaaati~ with the democratic VO'l"ld against 
the Ocmmm:lst world ma,. be shocking to our aensib:ll• 
-~ies, but it ougtit not to be v1ewllld aa a disuter. 
Quite the Cmrtl'817 • 1'he ftZ'J faci; that the new 
countries 'IOte as t.he7 please is PlfOOf that • ewn 
in this earliest stese ot tr.air f'reedm • the7 8ft 
act1Dg as ~ etates, which preciael.)' the 
role that w bad hoped 'the7 would assume once they 
emerp4 tran thelr colGllial ata'tu•·uo 
Before the Senate Foreign. Relat1ana C<laittee, Oakes points out, Dean Rusk, 
the to.smer SecJ.'Otar7 at state saw test!m~ in which he said s 
I do not bellew that we, ourmlwa 8houl.d he 
undul.7 concerned abotlt What might be called the 
genuine neutraltm because 1f' a naw mrticm. is 
intenlall,J' v1go1ou, visible, strong, ~ss1w, 
its orientaticn in fONian policy !snot 80 ta• 
PQl."tant as its health and stioength ••• I do not be• 
line that w ab.oald tn.s:lst that a~ one Who :la not 
with us ts ageinat us.1n 
Is the world better att tor all these militaey alU.ancea, eoe.llttons 
and pa.eta to maintato. the so-called balance at power? 'lhe7 haw OD the 
ccmtJ:rar:r led the world to becCll\E! a victim ot c.iua nee and pl.,aced it in a 
aS.tuaticm. wb.erein the concept at 'balance at powier• baa been ieplaced b7 a 
nev ccnceph •the balance ot terror. '1'h18 is vbat the ecmf~ at ideologies 
• daocraey and CQrft\83.:la - has led ti:• world in:to. 
now 18 the lllOC1em world in a balance ot tel"l'OI' s:ltuats.an tacla71 
'1'he answer 'to this questim lies in the histo.1.7 ot tba ams race in which 
the two power blocs bs:ve been VJing with each other. Furtbel.'more, trcn the 
behavior or China 1n the caamist bloc and that at France 1n the dcmocnt1e 
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world the ccncept of bi:pol.arity ot the cold war loses its meaning. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. makes this observaticm: 
••• nothing exhibits mOl"e arrestingly the decline 
of Su,perpowership than the spectacle :In recent 
years of 8u;per powers Pl\Shed around by their 
satellite• • the Soviet Union by Bast OeJ.'Dl&D1'1 
Cuba, end North Vietnam; the United states b7 
South Korea, South Vietnam and ~iwan. Tocqu.e• 
ville 1 a old forecast • America and Russia, each 
1merked out by the will of Heaven to fN8.7 the 
destinies of halt of the globe" - has had 1n the 
end, an exceedf.ngly short run.112 
Did India, as a DElber ot the !hird World, play an)' s1gnj.i"ieant part 
so as to deserve a special ment1cm at this po:J.ntf lzldia ve.s the first 
comitry to procla:lm the policy ot ncmaligmn.ent 1n 1nternat1cm.al relations. 
In September 19)+6, BebJ'u as the Member 1n charge ot Bxternal Affairs and 
Canmanwalth Relat1cms 1n the Government of India, declared that l'.ndia would 
keep away tran power politics of grou;ps aligned against one another, which 
have led 1n the past to world ware and vhich may again lead tto disasters 
on an ewn 'ft.Ster scale. He also elaborated all the basic p.re:mises ot the 
policy, like anti-eoloniellan, nonal.:1gmnent 'With power blocs and faith 1n the 
United Nations. lf'or a tev JW&rS India vu the CJDl1' country 1n the world to 
:pursue the polley of nonal:tgmnent as its basis ot approach to contemporary 
international :relatians. For the last twnt:r three JW&rs the :popul.arity 
of this :policy has been grow1ng at a pbencnenal rate and a large number ot 
countries at Asia, Atrica and Bu.rope also followed sui:t. (See Table 11 
page 82). Today nonalignment ba8 can.e to oceu,w an indispensable place 1n 
the theory and practice of world politics. "No theory of international 
relations is caru>lete," writes ;s. w. Burtrm, •wi.thout an explanation of the 
devel0llll9D.t or, and a theory of 1 nansligmnent • .,u3 Re gives four reasons. 
First 1 nonalignment is a special feature of the current world 81Stem to which 
the ccrmmm.ications, rather than the power, model is suited. This means that 
en alliance is a SJm,Ptcm of a break-a.own in ca.umunication: it also contri-
b'!Jtes to a further deterioration 1n perception, feed •back and other parts of 
a flexible 1ntemational system. Only through power can a state afford to 
maintain inefficient ca:mmmications 87stem, and the nonaligned states have 
limited power. :&liq contact rlth East and West is essential to the purS'J.1t 
of their nation.al interests. Unlika 'nautrals,' which are content to stand 
aloof, the nonaligned states are, for pressing econanic, strategic and pol• 
itical reascms, obliged to maintain open ca:nmm1cat1ons with all leading 
nations. NonalJ.gnmen.t as a foreign policy is in aey nent dictated by the 
need to maintain uncaimdtted to those economic and political institutions 
inherited fra.u the West, whieh may or may not prove suited to the needs of 
new nations as they develop. It may be neither capitalism nor cammmiem Whic: ti 
is required and which ultimately emerges, and canm:ttment to either would 
introduce rigidities which could prejudice d.eveloiment. Second, ncma.11.gnment 
reflects sane of the features of a developing world cam.unity and 1n this 
sense is itself a corrective to the ca:ummieatians model. 'ftd.rd, non.align• 
ment has inherent within it certain features which are dneloping amongst 
aligMd states and throws same light upon the relations between the aligned 
11~on, p. 163. 
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states. Fourth, nonalignment offers an alternative game and set ot rules 
which is likely to be 1m:portant once nuclear deterrence is no longer credible. 
SU.Ch is tr£ importance of nonalignment today. It certa1nly redO\mda to the 
credit of India to have adopted it as the basis of its foreign policy tor the 
first time t\lent;y three ,ears ago among the nations of the ~ird World. 
:r 
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TABLE 1 
MIMBliftS OF mE UNrrED NA'fIOliS AS AT DB::!M.BJlt 1963, SIOWDG ALIGNMllf.l' STATUS 
(Bracketed countries are not members of the U.N.) 
NBJ'mALmr CCl4MUNim' WESflltN 
----.. --.. --------~·,~·--.--,~-· 1--~~-·~ 
African 
States NATO 
not SF.A'fO 
Nonaligned (Belgrade f ontal.l1' Cllft'O 
Canf'erence, 1961) Neutrals nonaligned Warsaw other Alliances OAS other 
Af gbanistan Austria Burtmdi Albania Byal. Austr. Argen. China• 
Algeria '1'1nland Cameroun* Bulgaria (China) i Belgt. Bol1v1.** J'armosa 
Burma Isoa Centrl. Czach. Mcmg. Canad. Braz.** Ireland 
Cmbodia Sweden Atric. R. (E. Genaan) (N .Kor) Denmark Chile*** Ierel 
Ceylon (Switzer- Chad* Hungary Ukraine France Colm. Jamaic. 
Congo- land) Congo- Poland Greece Cost. R. Japan 
Brazzaville Leopold. Rumania Icela. Daa. R Jordan 
Cuba Dahaaey u.s.s.R. Iran Ecuad .***Ma lays. 
Cyprus Gabon Italy El Sal. (s. Korea) 
Bthiopia Ivory c.• Luxum. Gaut. Spain 
Ghana ICeD1f1 Nether. Haiti s. Atric. 
Guinea Kuwait New z. Rand. Trinad. 
India Liberia Norway Mextc.** & Tobago 
Indonesia Lib JS Pakist. Ifiear. 
Iraq Madagasc~ Philip. Pan.am. 
Llbanon Mauritania Portug. Parag. 
Meli Niger't Th.ail. Peru 
Morocco Nigeria Turkey Urug.*** 
Nepal Rwanda U.K. Venez.*** 
Saudi Arabia Senegal* u.s.A. 
Sanalia Sierra Leone (w. Germ.) 
&ldan Rogo 
Tunisia Uganda 
TABLE l (Conttmad) 
~S OF 'nm UNIUD HA!l'IONS AS AT DJCliMB'llR 19631 ~"DIG ALIGNMliJf? STA1'US (Bmcketed countriee ere not; members ot the U.H.) 
- -----~'--~- --·~-·---~----·-·-------~--------------·-·-------·- ·------- -----~---
l 
I 
N:ml.llALIEJl C<MUflm' WBSl'mil 
~-~~-------·-·-~--------- --·-
Mrican 
states NA1':> 
not ' SEATO 
B onal!g,ned (Belgrade tonmll7 I cmrm Cmfft'ence 1 1961) Neutrals nonaligned Warmv other l Alliances OAS Other 
i 
u. Arab R. Upper Volta* 
I Yemen Zfmzibar 
Yugoal.81118 
I §lm!.~l.BJ:.d !llllligel. 
I 
! 
a,rta I ~ I 
! : 
4(1) lo(3) I 10(1) 113(6) '?otalt 27 23 20(1) I 19 
i 
* Members of the Brazzaville " Observer at Belgrade ..,. Obaerwr at Ctdro 
grou.p ot Fnnch-epeaking 
countries 
U4 
3. w. Burton, p. 214. 
CHAPTER VII 
CO'NCWSION 
By following the policy of ncm.allgnment, India. was not a passive 
spectator but en active participant 1n international events end developaents. 
This .1ust1t1es Nehru's terminology ot cqnamic neutralism to de scribe India's 
foreign. pol1c7. He further clarifiecl this pol.1c:r 1n his reply to the debate 
on March 17, 1959 in the Lok Sabha (House ot the People) an the demands tor 
grants tor the Miniatr:r ot Ex.tern.al Affairs as follows: 
It is not a questian ot 'punr than 'thou' attitUde 
or high morality. We know our faults ve:r7 well, 
and we know the Yirtues ot others, scnetimes even 
those when we criticise. But gradually in the 
courae ot the ,ears people came 'to realize that we 
were not pcstng, that we were not moralizing, but 
that we were following a certain policy in all 
good faith end that policy while being one delib• 
erately ot friendship 'to other countries was Jet 
one not only of ncn-e.lignment as such but sauething 
deeper than that, ot doing smaething that we 
thOUSht right in the circumstsnces.115 
Thus 1.n.dia acted according to vb.at It tho'Jght right in the ch'cumstances ot 
world affairs. By and large her approach to evecy problem 1n the arena of 
international politics did meet with a measure of success. T. waiter Wall 
says: 
Since 19!1-7 India and :Pakistan have pl.Ecyed iaportant 
roles 1n world attairs. 1'ba former 1 P81"ticUlarl.7 
has been astonishingly active 1n exercising a decis• 
iw 1ntlmnce 1n to.temational relations. lhdia 
wie lde<i :!mportant ~might "n the afte.irs or the 
Un.1ted Nations; She had an important part in the 
U5Xp.a,1e t;'• 4:3. April 1 1 19591 "Policy ot Hem.alignment Serve• 
Cause ot World aace." 
_ nt. _ 
- '.J) .. 
Korean truce; assisted materially 1n securing the 
end of hostilities in Indochina.J ac1ied as mediator 
in Chi:nase •United states relaticm.s: and 1n gen-
eral worked with ccm.siderable suct:ess tor the pre• 
aervatian of -world peace.116 
India is the biggest country 1n the Third World. !.ndia's pioneer 
effort against colonial rule, eou.~led vi.th the world P'l"Ollinence attained 
by Gandhiji and Nehru gave her a positicm. at leadership amang the nations 
which achieved treedan after World War II. For following moral principles, 
especially the principles of non-violence as taught by Oendhiji 1n the con.• 
duct of its foreign policy, India gained world support and :recognition. As 
we a Pointed out earlier 1 the wry policy at nonalignment • the refusal to 
join the :power blocs in the Cold war • stems from the Gandhian ideology of 
nonviolence. "Idealists, pa.c1t1ats, and seekers at peace everywhere haw 
been moved by !.ndia'a advocae7 ot nm-violence, disarmament, and peaceful 
coexistence • 1n abort 1 adherence without equivocation to the teachings 
ot Christ and Buddha. wll7 
Bven 1n dreams, !.ndia could not have hoped to dislodge the British 
rule b7 resorting to violent means. h British lbp1re was the mightiest 
at that time. !be a1tuat1m was hopeless and the whole count1"1' was 1n des• 
pair. It was at this critical maaent that Oandhi.11 came forward to lead 
the nation with his Satla.fl!EMI (passive resistance) and nonviolence. 
Nehru. describes 1n these wrdss 
••• there seemed to be no wa7 out at the intolerable 
conditions of a degrading servitude. People vbo 
were at all sensitive t'elt terribly depnssed and 
11
"1istoU. p, 294-295. 
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helpless. This was the manent when Gendh:t put 
forward his programme of non-cooperaticm. Like 
Sinn Fein ta Irelsnd, it taught us +." rely on 
ourselves and build ~ our own strength, and it 
wee obviously a very effective method. of bringing 
presaure cm the gover-mnent •••• It was to be per-
fectly peaceru.J., and yet it was not mere non• 
resistance. Sameh.i wac e. definite, though 
non-violen:t, f'orm of resistance to w'.DBt was con• 
sidered tf?'QD.g. It was, in effect, a peaceful re-
bellion, a most civ1.lized form of 'tl8rf'are, and ,et 
danaerous to the stability at the state. It ws 
an effective way or getting the masses to :tunetion, 
and it seemed to fit Sn With the peculiar genius 
of the Indian people •UB 
Thus India was able to emerge rran centuries of bandage end take her pl.ace 
among the galaxy of natiolls with self-respect end honor, thanks to the 
Gandhian creed of non-riolenee. As far as lnd ia was coneemed 1 he made a 
fear-ridden people tearless. The prisan-houses anif. the gallows 'Which used 
to awe the people were transformed into holy shrines. He endowed nm-
violence 'With paver. !Ie taught the virtue at self-0.1sdipl1ne end self'• 
purification to the individual, and disciplined, organized action to the 
masses for overcan!ng social, ecananic, am Political ills. He brought 
religion• not credel rel1gian but essential religion • into politics and 
set about the task at spir1tualiz1ng politics with measurable success. Not 
only did he u:plift a degraded people into great nation but he ennobled the 
tone of Ptlbl1c life. 
This does not mean that the people of Jndie in general and the Indian 
Nationt\l Congress in particular followed Gandh1j11 s teachings :ln every letter 
and spirit. His teachings were violated many t:bMs not due to aey detect 
118 ~ses af !Ofld !!1@217 (U:mdan: Asie Publishing House 1 2nd. ed • 1 
1962) I PP• 7 2Ji'.3. 
1n them but due to weakness in the people themselves. 
!he fact is that like other great prophets - Buddha, 
Christ or Mohammad - Gandhi also was too great, his 
ideals too high. to be ccmpletely followed by his 
disciples. Naturally they often seem to drift away 
tran their masters. But the master's teachings always 
remained as an inspiring ideal which is never achieved 
but 'Whose imprint al'W1l7a remains ineffaceable. ,,., 
~i 
Notwithstanding sane minor lapses fl"Clll the Gandhian pa.th of non-violence, 
India was able to make spectacul.ar progress bath daaestically and interna-
tionally. starting fl"Cll1 her own achievement of treedan tran tbe British 
through nan""'liolent means and acting as the honest broker to ease interna• 
tional tensions wherever and whenever the Cold War became hot threatening to 
undemine the fOlmd.ations of world peace. India has 1ncreased her strength 
at hane and her prestige abroad. 1'h1s is, in a nutshell, the quantum of 
benefit that India was able to :reap trcn the Gandhian ideology of non""'liolencE. 
~ougb. !.nd1a might haft gained by adhering to the creed of nonviolence, 
thf. questim !1187 be asked, rill the world stand to gain also, if it were to 
practice nan-violent m.ethOda for the settlement of international disp1tesf 
Undoubtedly the answer is Je•• Instead of resorting to war and violence to 
settle dispate a among nations 1 the world Will be much better ott shoulcl 
nm""Violenee becane the guiding star of the leaders of nations and the states• 
men ot the world. A clear understanding of the world situatim today will 
convince 8Il10IW 1 of the need and n.ecessit7 of nan-violence. 
To quote David R. Inglis: "world politics is daninated b)" "two atanic 
colossi eyei.'og each other (more or less) malevolently across a divided 
world," to ado:Pt President Eisenhower's phrase.•120 He lists sane four Sm-
portent reasons tor the existence ot a veey serious danger of a nuclear wr 
breaking out at 8Jl1' time. !hey an: war by accident, b7 m1: .Judgment, b7 
escalaticn, or b)" catal.7a:ts (the setting ott at a big reaction b)" a small 
agent Which 'tlJlq 1tselt escape ham). The undoing of the human race, Dr. 
Inglis points out, nuq be that its technical advances haw been so 1"flpid 
that its statecra:tt can newr catch up. Against nuclear atta.ck no technical 
dei"ense is expected to be adequate. ?n. such a can.text ne>bod.)", :tn his right 
senses, wants a war. The Dean of American Catholic biblical Scholars, 
Father John L. Mclfanz:ie S.J. cc:mde:mns war. 
I think that war is easential.ly irrational. And 
immoral. It's essent1alq i?'rational because violence, 
b7 dei"1nit1on, 1s not a aoluticn of hllf!A guest1ms. 
It might defend me against a wild animal, but mlless 
I reduce the human being to a wild animal, I'm not 
settling azrr tasue that exists between us. !he human 
way to solve human problems is raticnal discourse. 
Violence ia used an the assumption that rational 
discourae a 't solve the problem •• •121 
!his does not mean th.at one sb.ollld submit to evil. The evil should 
be resisted, no doubt. But the means should be human and not beastly. It 
is here Gendh1an nonviolence and sat,.agraha cane into the picture. 'l'.b.e)" are 
both human end superior to war. B. B. D1wakar enumerates the points of 
ditterence between war and Se:t188J.'&ha thus: 
12
<\Juqiear Wea:pao.1 !A4 the Cmf].ict ot C9QSC&sce. p. 56. 
121
"Catholics" 1n ltgtest:~Ui9 f5Jl'.%!l1t3&1• ed. b7 James 
Finn (New.York: Vintage Books, l , pp. 5 • 
War uses physica1 force. SatJ&graha uses moral 
force. War stands for violence, tor deatruetian 
of' person and propert7, for annihil.atian of the 
opponent or his humiliating sul:nissian. Satyagre.11 
stands for nonviolence, noninjt.u:'y to person and 
property, 81.@POrts the p.rinciple of live and let 
lift, does not wish to humiliate the opponent 
but would treat him as an equal. war mtlicta 
the highest wttering. Satyagraha invites the 
utmost suffering. War appeals to might. Satya-
sraha appeals to :reasan. War results in heavy 
losses. The losses involved in Satyagraha cam• 
paigns ere ligb.t. War as an institution does not 
stand for canprc:mise. Se.tyagraha always admits 
canpradse Oil ncm.esaent1als. War engenders hatred, 
anger and the spirit of J."e'98nge. Satyagraha pro• 
motes loft, ccnpaaa1an., and p1t7 .... war is a bar• 
barous method. Setyagraha is a civilized and 
Christian method ••• 122 
On an imPf,lrtial analy'ais, it must be admitted that both nonviolence 
and n.onal.1gnment are cancept;s Which are too well mown to the West. Chris-
t1anit7 1s a primarily llestern religion.. Jesus Christ was tba very embodi-
ment of nonviolence. Mahatma Gandhi did no more than emulate Jesus Christ. 
Ile d.eserves credit for dramatising nonviolence b7 applying it to 1.ndia's 
struggle for independence. As to non-a.ligament, George Washington advised 
Americans not to be involved 1n 8?cy' entangling alllances soan after the7 
became tree 1 which advice the7 scrupulousl7 followed until the First World 
War and profited enoraowsl.7 to the point of becan:tng the richest end strang-
est. nation 1n the world. Javaharlal Nehru did no more than just follow 
Wesn:tngton and advised his countr,r not to entangle itself with the power 
blocs and to be nanalJ.sn,ed 1n the Cold War. Jesus and Gandhi practised 
nonviolence and proved its success and superiority. Washington and Nehru 
followed nonalignment for their respective catmtries and proved its merit 
end efficacy 1n solving problems, danest1c and foreign. 'lhese are great 
saints and statesmen Who bad lef't •:root prints on the sands ot time." The 
world will be richer, stronger tm.d nobler by following their foot Prints. 
Joan V. Bondurant concludes her thought-provoking book with the observation: 
"!he Gandhian experiments suggest that if man is to free himself' from tear 
and threat alike, he pause 1n his flight tran violence to set himself the 
task of its conquest."123 Unless men conquers violence, he will perish by 
violence. In tll1s da7 and e.p When Sputniks, Explorers and guided missiles 
threaten the total snn1h1lat1on ot mankind, the choice between nations is 
123egwu.eg gt Violew;e: The Gandhian l'b.ilonoJ&:r qt £gptlict (Revised 
ed. Berkeley and Los Aneeless Un.iwraity at California Press, 1965), p. 233. 
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